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Abstract 
The following dissertation sets out to investigate the decline of agriculture in 
Mission location at Butterworth, Transkei, using the Rehabilitation Scheme as a 
benchmark. The scheme was introduced in 1945 to combat soil erosion and improve 
agriculture in the African reserve areas, as the South African government claimed. 
The dissertation argues that this claim by the government served to mask the real 
intentions behind the scheme namely, to regiment the migrant labour system by 
depriving as many Africans as possible of productive land so that they were unable 
to fully subsist by means of agriculture. This is further shown by analysing the 
impact of the Rehabilitation scheme in Mission location in which a substantial 
number of people lost arable land as a result of the implementation of the scheme in 
1945. These people were consequently denied the wherewithal to subsist by 
agriculture. Moreover, the efforts of the government resulted to a modernisation of 
agriculture by making it more cash-based- for example through the introduction of 
fencing, the need for tractors as a result of a decline in stock numbers (in part as a 
result of stock culling). Most people could hardly afford this type of agriculture and 
were consequently forced off the land. The dissertation concludes that indeed the 
decline of agriculture in Mission location can be linked to the changing agricultural 
and land-holding practices brought about by the government- especially the 
introduction of the Rehabilitation scheme.     
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Chapter One 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. The Study Area 
 
1.1.1. The Transkei 
The people of the Transkei, which is the stretch of land situated in the south-eastern 
part of the Republic of South Africa, were ruled by independent African chiefdoms 
until the beginning of the 1870’s when white rule was extended beyond its borders 
through annexation (Saunders, in Saunders & Derricourt, 1974: 185). First it was 
the extension of control, and not necessarily formal annexation, which saw the Cape 
Province that had been granted responsible government, bringing the Transkei 
within its bounds (Saunders, 1974). Though it was a lengthy and often difficult 
process, Transkei was annexed, bit-by-bit, and this was finally accomplished in 1894 
(Saunders, 1974). The result of this was that, by 1894, the whole of Transkei was 
brought under white magisterial rule, with government-appointed location headmen 
that reported to the district magistrates comprising the local leadership.  
 
 Annexation of the Transkei served a number of purposes for the Cape 
administration and its white citizens. Firstly, it allowed white land seizure especially 
in the Ciskei, then called British Kaffraria, since it became possible to dump 
Africans in this part of the Cape in the Transkei (Saunders, 1974). To accomplish 
this, Transkei had to be kept separately from the Cape colony proper; that is, it had 
to be ruled differently from the Cape Province, and land grabbing by whites in the 
area was prevented at all costs. Secondly, if Transkei was fully incorporated into the 
Cape Province, the white population, which by then was only one third of the Cape 
population, could have been outnumbered (Saunders, 1974). Consequently, it was 
agreed upon by the Cape politicians that Transkei should not only be ruled more 
autocratically, but also should be made a “reserve” to protect it from white farmers’ 
inroads, it was claimed. But Saunders rightly points out that this was also going to 
make it easier to turn the area into a labour pool. The danger of Africans 
outnumbering whites was that, given their qualification to vote if they earned an 
annual salary of fifty pounds or possessed landed property to the value of twenty- 
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five pounds, they could have had more say in the government of the day (Mbeki, 
1964). So Africans were not only going to be ruled separately from the Cape, but 
were also going to be disenfranchised; this being done by means of successive 
legislations culminating in the passing of the Bantu self-Government Act of 1959 
that eliminated the representation of Africans in both the House of Assembly and 
the Senate, and also put in place the Bantu Authority system (Mbeki, 1964). 
Consequently, the only place for Africans in the white areas of South Africa 
(comprising 88% of the total land surface of the country and containing practically 
all the natural resources and advanced development) has been roughly that of those 
who provided their labour to the white economy (Mbeki, 1964). Moreover, this has 
been made worse by the state of the reserves, which according to Mbeki (1964) were 
South Africa’s backwaters, primitive rural slums, soil eroded and underdeveloped.   
 
 Comprising a total of 3 855 692 hectares or rather 4, 5 million morgen in 
extent, Transkei is bounded by the Umtamvuna river in the north, the great kei 
river in the south, the Indian ocean in the east, and the drakensberg mountains in 
the west (Prinsloo, 1976: 5-6). Historically, the area has been occupied mainly by 
two different ethnic groups namely, the Cape Nguni (mainly Xhosas though there 
are other immigrant groups such as the Mfengus and the Bhacas), as well as the 
South Sothos. 
 
 Of the 4, 5 million morgen total area of Transkei, 1 million is suitable for 
arable farming according to Leeuwenberg’s (1977) research findings, and this state 
of affairs might have changed by now as a result of a number of factors including 
soil erosion. According to Leewenberg, climatically the rainfall is nowhere less than 
20 inches a year. Though unreliable, rain falls during the summer season between 
November and February. With fairly good rains, many perennial rivers, and a fairly 
high quality of the soil, Transkei has a fairly good agricultural potential (Prinsloo, 
1976: 6). But this is in contrast to a regression in the economy of the Transkei that 
has taken place over the years. Such a regression is best illustrated by two 
processes; in the first place, there has been a decline in food production over the 
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years and consequently more maize, the staple food, has been imported than is 
locally produced. In the second place, there has been an isolation or extrusion of 
large numbers of people from subsistence farming, and this inevitably brought 
about a large-scale dependence on migrant labour remittances (Leeuwenberg, 1977: 
7). Poor agricultural development (for instance as a result of most of the ploughing 
that was-in the past- done by ox-drawn ploughs that lightly till the soil), as well as 
overstocking that inevitably led to soil erosion, are said to be responsible for a 
decline in food production (Leeuwenberg, 1977). Overstocking and the resultant soil 
erosion led the government to introduce soil conservation through the Betterment 
and the Rehabilitation schemes not only in the Transkei, but also in all the reserve 
areas. But as an African reserve area in which large numbers of people were 
concentrated on too little land, Transkei could become nothing but an area where 
human and livestock populations were congested, and consequently an area where it 
was virtually impossible to have a piece of land large enough to provide a family 
with full subsistence. 
 
1.1.2. Butterworth 
According to McGregor (1977: 1), on the banks of the Gcuwa river, where the 
supreme Xhosa paramount chief Hintsa’s great place was located when Reverend 
William Shaw, the only ordained man who came with the British settlers, came to 
ask for permission to build a mission station in the area, lies the town of 
Butterworth.  Butterworth is one of the 28 districts that made up the Transkei. The 
Methodists founded it in 1827 as the first Mission station in the Transkei (Sampong, 
Owusu-Acheampong & Musampa, 1991: 10). In effect, it represented the first 
Missionary infiltration in the Transkei. Though with a humble start, the settlement 
slowly grew into a center of commercial activities especially when the impetus was 
provided by the selection of the town as the headquarters of the British troops 
during the Kaffir wars of the 1870’s and 1880’s (Sampong et al, 1991: 10).  
 
 Butterworth lies 120 km from Umtata, the capital city of the former 
Transkei, and 110 km from East London, the nearest harbour town (Sampong et al, 
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1991). It is only 30 km from the Kei River, the former border between the Transkei 
and the Republic of South Africa. The area of the town in 1991 was recorded as 1 
989 hectares. 
 
 Economically the development of the town can mainly be divided into two 
distinct phases. Phase one is the period before 1970 during which the development 
of the town mainly depended on such advantages as its location on the National road 
and its rail connections. During phase two, that is the period after 1970, the town 
changed a great deal as a result of its selection as one of the growth points in the of 
the industrial decentralisation policies of the South African government (Sampong 
et al, 1991: 11-12). Moreover, though very little or nothing has been written about 
agricultural development in Butterworth per se, it is asserted here that, the 
description of the state of agriculture in the entire Transkei as provided above here 
includes Butterworth.  
 
 One of the most important parts of districts in the reserve areas is what is 
called ‘iilali’ (locations) especially since the bulk of the population in these areas is 
to be found there. In Butterworth there are twenty-five of these. Ilali (singular) is 
the crux of what makes up rural areas and according to Leeuwenberg (1977: 5) can 
be defined as a fairly well defined cluster of homesteads that is a basic unit of 
settlement with its local name, its own grazing and agricultural lands. The average 
size of an ilali can be anything between 3 and 12 square miles, and a government 
appointed headman, who is answerable to the district magistrate, is responsible for 
the day-to-day administration of the area- such as the allocation of land 
(Leeuwenberg, 1977). Today, especially with the advent of democratic rule that saw 
the Transkei being made part of the Eastern Cape Province, headmen work 
alongside Local Government councilors- as in terms of the new Local Government 
dispensation that was established in 1999. Two types of iilali are found in the 
reserves; these are, first, the ordinary locations and second, the Betterment areas 
(that is, areas which have been declared in terms of the government conservation 
schemes for the purposes of reversing soil erosion and improving agriculture, as it 
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was claimed in government circles). Mission location, which is the subject area of 
this dissertation, is one of the locations that make up the rural part, or rather the 
countryside, of the Butterworth district. 
 
1.1.3. Mission Location 
Mission location, which encircles the Butterworth town in the shape of a letter C, 
bounding it on the NW, SW and SE (TPC 2/36/5/25, 1946: 1), has one of the most 
interesting histories both in Butterworth and in Transkei as a whole. To illustrate 
this, it is the home of the first Missionary station in the entire Transkei, namely, the 
Ayliff Memorial Church originally set up in 1837, as well as a missionary junior 
secondary school founded in 1853. 
  
The location has three well defined sectors, namely, Ngxalathi, Mission 
central and Mabinza’s or Mzantsi (meaning South), which together divide into nine 
separate residential areas, eight of which are in Mission central and Mabinza’s  
(TPC 2/36/5/25, 1946: 1). Mainly four headmen have ruled the area since the 
introduction of the Rehabilitation scheme in 1945. These are Mr. C. W. Monakali, 
whose headmanship saw the introduction of the scheme; Mr. Dabula Mampofu; Mr. 
Mzoli Zitumane; and Mr. Mtsibeli Tsipa who was appointed by the government in 
1998 and is still in office at present. With the 1999 local government elections that 
brought about a new dispensation in this sphere of government, Mission location 
now has Mr. Kholisile Mpeluza, a former sub-headman, as its first councilor 
working side-by-side with the headman. Mission location has a total area of 4 906 
hectares, and for the purposes of this dissertation Mission central, which the 
researcher is more familiar with, was chosen. Out of the four residential areas that 
make up Mission central (namely Mmangweni, Sigingqi, Jekete and Bhongoza), 
only one (Bhongoza) was chosen as the actual study area. The reason for choosing 
only one residential area is that the area is now too large (up to 600 or 700 dwelling 
sites and, because all the four areas exhibit the same characteristics, at least as far 
as agriculture is concerned, choosing one randomly was considered appropriate and 
generalization was thought of as possible. 
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 Bhongoza has 118 dwelling sites. Like the rest of the location, something 
particular would strike any visitor to the area. This is the abandonment, or rather 
absence of cultivation, in the lands that were demarcated for this particular purpose 
in terms of the Rehabilitation scheme that was introduced to the area in 1945. It is 
this absence of cultivation, characterized here as a decline in agriculture, that is the 
subject matter of this dissertation, especially in view of the fact that the introduction 
of the Rehabilitation scheme had the specific aim of improving agriculture in the 
area. 
 
1.2. Methodology 
1.2.1. Primary Sources 
Primary sources are sources that provide data collected at first hand; that is to say, 
they are original sources of data produced by the people responsible for the actual 
collection of such data (Mann, 1985: 67). There can be quite a number of problems 
with the definition of primary data sources. Firstly, a purist definition tends to 
suggest that the writer has personally collected data him/herself, a proposition that 
is falsified by the case of many writers who might be involved in the writing up of 
information collected by for example many other people such as in the case of a 
census (Mann, 1985). Secondly, the author might have made use of research 
assistants in the collection of data (Mann, 1985). But, despite these problems, what is 
important in the description of primary sources is that they provide original data, 
that is, data that has not existed before. 
 
(a) Sources used 
The main source of data collection used in this dissertation is the interviews 
conducted on a one-to-one basis. It is true that the subject matter of Sociology is 
interaction, and that one way of achieving this is by verbal conversation between the 
Sociologist and the party who is the source of the sought-after knowledge in order to 
gain systematic knowledge of social reality, [or rather what is thought of as social 
reality] (Benney & Hughes in Bulmer, 1977: 234). Moreover, since every 
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conversation has its own balance of revelation and concealment of thought and 
action (Mann, 1985), one-to-one interviews were chosen in order to get an insight of 
the peculiar experiences of each different respondent. The interviews were based on 
a pre-arranged interview schedule containing 14 questions and the responses were 
recorded by means of a tape recorder. A total of two tapes were used to record the 
interviews. The main advantage of this arrangement is the uniformity it accords to 
the interview process, or that it allows the interviewer to ask the same questions in a 
pre-determined order as well as to record the responses in a standardised way 
(Mann, 1985).  
 
 But who was interviewed and how were these chosen (that is, what method of 
sampling was used)? Basically, 21 homesteads were targeted for an interview, even 
though in the end only 17 were successfully interviewed (the other four being 
absentee landlords). The method of sampling used was however a mixture of both 
cluster sampling, a method by which sub-units (in this case households) are grouped 
together and work is therefore concentrated on them, and focus group sampling 
because, though no group interviews were conducted, those selected all had the same 
characteristics or interests as Mann (1985) defines a focus group (and these were 
peculiar to them throughout the area). These were chosen because they commonly 
had the same privilege of being the only ones with access to arable land in the area 
and, since it was felt that they could all be possibly interviewed successfully, all 21 of 
them were therefore targeted for an interview. 
 
(b) Problems encountered 
Three main problems were encountered in the process of conducting interviews. 
Firstly, there was a communication problem arising from the fact that most 
respondents could not respond to the questions as a result of them being scheduled 
in English. Most of the respondents were however illiterate to semi-literate, and they 
spoke Xhosa as a first language. To overcome this, the interviewer, who himself 
speaks Xhosa as a first language, improvised by translating the questions into 
Xhosa, thus facilitating communication and making possible the interview process. 
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To ensure that there was no departure from the original meaning of the questions, 
the interviewer, using his knowledge of both English and Xhosa, did translated the 
questions word for word. Secondly, the interviewer had to grapple with the question 
of what the respondents were going to get out of both their time spent in response to 
the questions as well as the outcome of the research itself (a question that was 
constantly asked throughout the interviews). For instance, it was asked whether the 
interviewer is a government agent attempting to revive agriculture in such an area 
where the latter has declined considerably. This is not an uncommon question in 
research situations since Benney & Hughes in Bulmer (1977: 237) make it clear that, 
for the interviewer, the benefit is clearer as the time given up by the respondents 
accounts for this, but for the respondents, the benefit is less apparent. Thirdly, as 
mentioned above that only 17 out of 21 households were successfully interviewed, 
there was a problem of absentee landlords. These four were eventually not 
interviewed as a result of their absence. 
 
1.2.2. Secondary Sources 
  This category of data collection sources differs from primary sources in that it 
consists of sources of data gathered at second hand; that is, it is made up of sets of 
data collected from other people’s original data (Mann, 1985: 67). Mann makes an 
interesting example to illustrate this definition. He talks of an author who for 
instance claims that about a third of dukedoms in Britain have been divorced, and 
says that, if this information was obtained from a book or journal by someone else, 
then it constitutes secondary data, and the book or article that is the source, a 
secondary data source. 
 
(a) Sources use 
The main secondary data source used in this dissertation are the South African 
government records that document the planning as well as the subsequent 
implementation of the Rehabilitation scheme in Mission location, Butterworth, in 
1945. All these reports were obtained from the Cape Archives in Cape Town and 
have formed an integral part of Chapter three of the dissertation. 
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(b) Problems encountered 
If any serious problem was encountered in the course of this dissertation, it is to be 
found in this particular subsection. The major problem here was to find the actual 
place where the government records were located. The initial belief was that these 
records are housed in the department of agriculture in the Bota Sigcau building in 
Umtata, which was the headquarters of all government departments in the 
independent Transkei. With this view in mind, a visit was made to Umtata in July 
2001. On arrival, the researcher had to move between the department of 
agriculture, its Registrar’s division as well as the department of Local government 
without even finding a trace of the said documents. What was so humiliating was the 
fact that even the staff members in these departments knew virtually nothing about 
both the Rehabilitation scheme as well as the location of documents about it. This 
was made worse by the bureaucratic structure of the department of agriculture, 
which meant that the researcher had to deal with someone who was appointed 
shortly after 1994 and had never worked there before. Poor record keeping also 
meant that these records were difficult to trace systematically. Eventually, one 
person who had worked there for some twenty years advised the researcher to go to 
Butterworth since, as the headquarters of the Fingoland region, it was possible that 
these documents were there as a result of transfers that came up with the 
establishment of the region. 
 
 In Butterworth, however, the same problems of poor knowledge by staff 
members, staff reshuffling and bureaucratic tendencies repeated themselves. Other 
problems in Butterworth included (i) the location of the department of Agriculture 
and Land affairs on a flood plain, and the fact that the heavy rains that hit 
Butterworth in 1985 did not only drown the buildings, but also destroyed most of 
the documents in them. For example, the map of Mission location the researcher 
was shown was in pieces; (ii) there were also problems with staff members who were 
reluctant to give a helping hand to the researcher. In this connection it was not 
uncommon to find most offices locked and most staff members in one office either 
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chatting with the sun shining through the window or even napping. It was also 
humiliating to be told that the planning officer (who would have been the most 
suitable person to attend to the researcher) had gone to attend a course in the 
Northern Province without even leaving a replacement. To complain about this an 
attempt was made to contact the MEC for Agriculture in the province, but to no 
avail. So Butterworth, too, was not of any help to the research. While still in 
Butterworth, numerous phone calls were made to the similar departments in both 
Bisho and East London, but even this did not bear any fruits. 
 
 Then it was thought that the Transkei government Archives in the back of 
the Nelson Mandela Museum building in Umtata might help. This meant another 
trip back to Umtata. On arrival there, with the sincere help of friendly staff 
members, the search for the documents continued, but still nothing was 
forthcoming. This, too, was given up and it meant the end of 2001 without the 
required documents. 
 
 It was only in March 2002 that the researcher was advised to visit the Cape 
Archives in Cape Town. This did not only result to a week stay in Cape Town that 
ended with the recovery of all the sought-after documents, but also shown staff and 
organization in contrast to the Transkei government departments. The staff in Cape 
Town were very friendly and helpful, had a clear understanding of most of the 
needed documents, and record keeping was of an amazing professional level. This 
ended the nightmare and the researcher went home with the necessary documents. 
 
1.3. Chapter Outline 
This dissertation, which mainly seeks to investigate the decline of agriculture in 
rural Transkei through the case of Mission location and using the Rehabilitation 
scheme as a benchmark, has five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. Chapter 
two provides a discussion of the introduction and course of the Betterment and 
Rehabilitation schemes in South Africa in line with the reserve policies of the South 
African government. The highlight of the chapter is the historical dispossessions of 
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Africans’ lands and their subsequent confinement to the reserve areas with the 
result that the practice of agriculture was not only impossible and soil erosion 
inevitable in these areas, but also that majorities were left with no choice but to seek 
wage labour. This was not even overhauled by the introduction of soil conservation. 
In this chapter, this state of affairs is treated as the actual intention behind the 
reserve policies of the South African government through to the forced removals of 
Africans into the reserves that were carried out through to the 1980’s.  
 
 In chapter three, the impact of the conservation schemes is examined with 
particular reference to Mission location, the study area, where the introduction of 
the Rehabilitation scheme took place in 1945. Central to the chapter are the land 
dispossessions of scores of families in the area resulting specifically from the scheme 
and their inevitable consequence of forcing those families out of agriculture as a 
source of livelihood. 
 
 Chapter four is very much based on the present state of agriculture in the 
area, and can be treated as a long-term evaluation of the progress of the 
Rehabilitation scheme. The remarkable decline in both arable and livestock 
agriculture in Mission location is the main subject of this chapter. The situation is 
not only that of exclusion of large numbers of families from both arable and 
livestock farming (measured in the smallness of the total number of families with 
access to both arable land and livestock), but also that even the majority of those 
with access to land are not using it for arable purposes. This is a result of changing 
agricultural and land ownership practices over the years especially brought about 
by state intervention that resulted to agriculture being a cash-demanding 
undertaking. Consequently, only three out of 21 households with access to arable 
land currently make use of it, and thus the decline in agriculture that is central to 
this dissertation. 
 
 In the summary and conclusions, that is, chapter five, all the arguments 
presented in the preceding chapters are tied together to show linkages between 
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them. The chapter also refers to alternative tenurial arrangements (such as 
leasehold) as well as the three current land cultivators (and the dynamics of their 
accumulation) as possible issues of future research interest. The chapter sums up 
the agricultural situation in the area as follows: the Rehabilitation scheme, and 
conservation planning in general, were nothing but attempts by the South African 
government to get as many Africans as possible out of agriculture as a source of 
livelihood [and alternatively into wage labour in the white areas] as evident in the 
case of Mission location in which agriculture has declined in spite of the so-called 
intentions of the scheme to improve it.                
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Chapter Two 
2. Betterment and Rehabilitation Planning in South Africa: 
                   “A brief Overview” 
2.1. Introduction 
The following chapter briefly introduces Betterment and Rehabilitation Planning in 
South Africa as, according to claims by the South African government, 
embodiments of soil conservation.  It is argued here that beneath the conservationist 
surface of these policies was the historic policy of preserving the reserves as the 
providers of cheap labour on a migrant basis by: denying Africans the wherewithal 
to subsist fully from the land; denying them full urban citizen status; and relocating 
large numbers of them in the reserves so that they remained there for both political 
reasons as well as at the disposal of the white economy. This is shown first by how 
the government responded to land deterioration in the reserves because in the first 
place it threatened this system of labour. Then the Betterment scheme is discussed 
with a view to showing how it denied people more land and cut down on their stock 
numbers in order to hamper the rural economy that was primarily based on 
agriculture. This is followed by the Rehabilitation scheme that sought to cut down 
on the number of Africans in urban areas by pretending to be enlarging the 
carrying capacity of the reserves in a way that further reinforced the migrant 
labour system. It is further shown here how the government’s determination to 
pursue this system of labour through the so called conservation schemes saw it 
altering its policies by making them more stringent and co-opting tribal authorities 
in response to widespread resistance of the people. Finally, the chapter shows how 
between the 1960’s and the 1980’s millions of Africans were removed from urban 
areas, white farms and black spots into the reserves in spite of the Tomlinson 
Commission’s recommendation that the reserve population be cut down for the 
purposes of viable agriculture, in a way that further reinforced the migrant labour 
system.     
 
2.2. The Socio-economic context of Betterment and Rehabilitation 
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The social history of South Africa is characterised by the transition of rural 
Africans from peasants to wage earners. This is best put by Bundy (1979: 1) who 
argues that “at the core of SA’s social history lies a transition of a majority of her 
rural African population- from their pre-colonial existence as pastoralist-cultivators 
to their contemporary status: that of sub-subsistence rural dwellers, manifestly 
unable to support themselves by agriculture and dependent for survival upon wages 
earned in ‘white’ industrial areas or upon ‘white’ farms”. The term sub-subsistence 
denotes a state whereby the type of agriculture that the land in the reserves 
permitted fell far short from being able to fully meet the subsistence needs of the 
people.   
 
The transition is a striking one, and its external aspects have been described 
often enough: the diminution of Africans’ lands by conquest and annexation, the 
creation of the ‘reserves’, and the deterioration of these into eroded, overstocked 
and overcrowded rural ghettos that function as a supply source of migrant labour. 
Clearly, this state of affairs in the reserves was a deliberate creation of successive 
colonial regimes that sought to secure a steady supply of cheap labour for both the 
mining and the farming capitals. In fact, the reserves were not only to supply cheap 
African labour on a migrant labour basis, but were also to house the dependents of 
such migrants so as to supplement their low wages by some rudimentary 
agriculture. But this role of the reserves- that is: housing the dependents of migrant 
labourers, contributing a proportion of the means of their subsistence, keeping 
migrant wages low, minimizing the growth of a settled urban proletariat, [as well as 
the overall reproduction of cheap migrant labourers]- was being threatened by the 
reserve agrarian decay as magistrates and officials, commissions, academics and 
employers not only observed, but also urged immediate state intervention (Beinart 
& Bundy in Klein, 1980: 297). It is exactly due to this erosion that the Native 
Economic Commission (NEC), among other observers, warned that: “unless 
precautionary measures are taken… denudation, donga erosion, deleterious plant 
succession, destruction of woods, drying up of springs, in short, the creation of 
desert conditions would ensue (UG 22/1932: 73 cited in Hendricks, 1990: 94).  
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 In response to these comments the South African government established the 
South African Native Trust (SANT) which, among other things was tasked to adopt 
‘remedial and redemptive measures for the existing reserves and for land to be 
acquired as ‘it is notorious that the existing native locations are congested, denuded, 
overstocked, eroded, and for the most part, in a deplorable condition’ (Statement of 
Land Policy, 1936: xix cited in De Wet, 1995: 40). To this end, the Department of 
Native Affairs primarily advocated soil conservation and as a first move, it 
introduced a rescue mechanism known as Betterment (Davenport, 1987: 394). 
 
2.3. The Betterment Scheme 
Betterment was a programme designed to arrest and reverse the destruction of 
natural resources, improve reserve agricultural production and raise the standard 
of living of the rural areas (O’ Connel, 1981: 44; De Wet, 1995: 39). It was the first 
concerted state effort to rehabilitate the reserves (Hendricks, 1990: 98). Betterment 
basically revolved around the proclamation of an area as a Betterment area, the 
development of a land-use plan which meant the division of the land into residential, 
arable and grazing areas separated by ring fencing and internal paddocking as well 
as the relocation of people from their previous (usually widely dispersed) homestead 
sites into new, village-type residential areas (McAllister, 1992: 3-4). This deplorable 
state of the reserves was seen as a technical one, and was chiefly due to “bad 
farming” on the part of the peasant (Yawitch, 1981: 10). More specifically, the 
increase in Transkei’s herds and flocks was seen as a prime cause, and this does not 
sit comfortably with the critical role that livestock played in the rural economy- as 
draught animals, in ceremonies, and in marriage transactions (Beinart et al in 
Klein, 1980: 300). As the state authorities maintained, what was needed, therefore, 
was more effective control if ‘Native agriculture was to improve (De Wet, 1995: 41). 
Clearly, therefore, the control of livestock threatened the survival of the rural 
economy. What was grossly ignored was the land shortages that have plagued the 
reserves since their establishment. 
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 To put these conservationist intentions of the central government into 
practice enabling legislation in the form of ‘Improvement and Control of Livestock 
in Native (African) areas’ Proclamation No. 31 of 1939 was provided, and basically 
designed to combat overstocking (Proclamation No. 31 of 1939: 3 cited in De Wet, 
1995: 41). The 1939 Proclamation, commonly called the Betterment Proclamation, 
enabled the authorities, after consultation with people residing in that area, to 
declare an area a Betterment area, where after they could ‘assess the number of 
cattle units which that area is able to carry’ and a count would be taken of all stock 
within the Betterment area. If the number revealed cattle in excess of the assessed 
carrying capacity, officials of the Department of Native Affairs (DNA) were 
empowered to conduct a cull of the excess stock. Despite the slow acquisition of land 
by the SANT, and the fact that up to 30% of families in the Transkei had no 
livestock, the Betterment officials were so determined to combat overstocking 
(Hendricks, 1990). Again, this is evidence of trying to avoid facing the real problem 
of the reserves- namely: shortage of land for both man and livestock, as well as 
declining levels of livestock- on the part of the government authorities. 
  
Though in theory Betterment could only be implemented after obtaining the 
consent of the local population, consultation with the people was so minimal that 
they had very little say on whether they wanted Betterment or not (McAllister, 
1992: 4). In fact according to Hendricks (1990: 97): “ when the scheme commenced, 
Betterment areas were declared by agreement between the district magistrate and 
headmen without consultation with the residents themselves, or where such 
consultative meetings did take place, the implications of the scheme were not 
exhaustively discussed”. Hence, it was not infrequent for the people to object to 
certain aspects of the scheme, since they had not fully understood their implications, 
and in the process this meant that the scheme was not being implanted with the 
consent of everyone, especially that of the people whose conditions it was destined to 
change; in short, this amounted to delays as far as the implementation process was 
concerned.    
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To overcome this delay the DNA insisted on getting the consent of the local 
resident first, but the Secretary General Mears maintained that it was best to use 
compulsion over government-recognised leaders. In the same way, the Planning 
Committee (P. C.) opposed the consultation clause, and its strong influence led the 
Chief Magistrate of the Transkei (CMT) to recommend the elimination of 
compulsory consultation since it was believed to hamper uniform planning, a 
demand to which the central government responded by postponing the contested 
issue stock limitation (Hendricks, 1990). 
 
 In the period when the World War Two broke out Betterment, which had 
hardly commenced, was delayed for some reasons related to the war effort. With 
only modest beginnings having been made, state focus on Betterment ceased being 
one of the top priorities as a result of the war (Beinart et al in Klein, 1980: 298). It is 
estimated that about half the staff responsible for Betterment took part in the war, 
and the prioritization of the war resulted to a decrease in the budget assigned to 
Betterment by about 75% from 125 000 to 50 000 pounds (Hendricks, 1989: 316). 
This meant a shortage of both staff and material, especially fencing. Consequently, 
according to Beinart & Bundy in Klein, 1980), the so-called conservation planning 
mainly became a feature of the postwar years [in the form of the Rehabilitation 
scheme]. Moreover, contrary to De Wet’s (1995: 42) assertion that Betterment was 
also delayed by white farmers who objected to loss of good land to the SANT, the 
acquisition of land by the SANT was so slow that by 1974 some 20% of land due had 
not yet been acquired (Platzky & Walker, 1985: 92). So not much good land was lost 
to SANT over these years. 
 
 In actual fact, according to Lacey (1981) white farmers did not object to the 
loss of good land per se, but rather to a loss of labour supply since, by enlarging the 
reserves and resettling illegal squatters as Smuts’s South African Party aimed to do, 
Africans tied to the white farms as labour tenants would have sold their stock and 
departed to the released land in the reserves- thus depriving white farmers of a 
labour supply. Moreover, since Africans in the reserves were simply absorbed to 
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urban areas where conditions of work were better than in the farms, they were not 
likely to return to the farms. In fact this was Smuts’s policy goal as he sought to 
favour the interests of the mining capital. It was only Hertzog’s United Party that 
came to the rescue of the farming capital by tying down Africans in the white farms 
to be labourers for at least six months each year and by requiring that to get 
employment elsewhere, former labour tenants had to be issued with an identity 
document specifying that they were no longer obliged to do farm work (Lacey, 
1981). Thus, even though authorized the release of land in 1936, the United Party 
ended the fear of white farmers.  
 
Regardless of the already mentioned hindrances to Betterment work, the 
Young Commission of 1949, appointed by the government during the war to enquire 
into overstocking in Transkei, recommended the extension of the 1939 Proclamation 
provisions to the whole Transkei (Hendricks, 1990: 102). Initially these provisions 
were confined to districts such as Butterworth, which was the first district to 
experience a Betterment programme in the Transkei, and Libode, the first to be 
completely rehabilitated (Beinart et al in Klein, 1980: 300-1). Pointing out that the 
government was already hardly managing to implement these provisions, the 
UTTGC strongly objected to this recommendation (Hendricks, 1990: 104). For 
Hendricks, this Commission’s recommendations had little consideration for both the 
prohibitive costs and social implications of a compulsory scheme, and in short were 
out of touch with reality. Meanwhile, the inability of the state to implement 
Betterment was evidenced in the fact that very few locations were being affected. 
Consequently, by 1945, only 114 of the 838 locations in the Transkei were declared 
Betterment areas, and stock culling had been completed in only three wards of the 
Gcuwa location of the Butterworth district (Hendricks, 1990). Clearly, Betterment 
was having very little, if any, impact towards changing the state of land and 
agriculture in the reserves, and the bulk of the population was still increasingly 
being forced into a state of proletarianisation. The reaction of the South African 
government to this is the subject of the next section.   
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2.4. The Rehabilitation Scheme 
The shift in government’s conservation policy, from the Betterment to the 
Rehabilitation scheme, had more to do with the changes in the economy of the 
country as well as the role of the African workforce in the face of such changes. An 
inflationary boom in the 1930’s as a result of a rise in the price of gold and an 
increase in manufacturing industries led to a rapid increase in the number of the 
African workers in urban areas from 76 000 in 1933 to 149 000 in 1945 (Beinart et al 
in Klein, 1980: 298). This meant that more Africans were being attracted to towns 
where wages and conditions of work were better than in the farming sector and, as a 
matter of fact, would soon demand social benefits such as housing. But the 
government, which has long battled with the competing labour needs of the 
industrial and agrarian capitals, influx controls for Africans coming into urban 
areas, and the political means to control an African working class, was not at ease 
with this new position of the African workforce. Given that this new outlook of the 
African worker was in contrast with the long established migrant labour system, 
and in effect meant that Africans were becoming more politically outspoken and 
permanent in urban areas, the government thought it necessary to intervene. To this 
end it was broadly agreed upon that what was needed was government intervention 
in the reserves so as to make them more capable of sustaining as many Africans as 
possible (Beinart et al in Klein, 1980).   
 
Accordingly, shortly before the end of the war the Major Piet van der Bly, 
the Minister of Native Affairs to the Smuts government outlined a blueprint for 
large-scale ‘rehabilitation’ of the reserves Hendricks, 1990). It is clear from the 
officials’ belief that, “if the situation in the reserves was not taken up with new 
vigour and without delay, the reserves will be rendered incapable of sustaining the 
natives and their stock, and the phenomenal drift of natives to towns has 
undoubtedly been accelerated by these conditions” (UTA CMT TPC 11/H, 1946 
cited in Hendricks, 1990: 105) indeed the scheme primarily aimed at dealing with 
the presence of Africans in urban areas. A sweeping effort to combat erosion by an 
extensive land-use plan, veld conservation, stock limitation, improvement of water 
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supplies, afforestation, re-grouping of kraal sites where necessary, building up of 
roads, bridges and railways, and acquisition of farms and through farming 
demonstrations was envisaged. In terms of this new scheme, it was presumed that 
some locations had to be planned in advance to serve as demonstration centers. 
 
 In line with this new vision, D. L. Smit, Secretary of Agriculture to the Smuts 
government, announced a new change of direction towards Rehabilitation in a 1945 
speech entitled “A New Era of Reclamation”. Smit envisaged, among other things 
that: (i) land be used in the most advantageous manner; (ii) land be demarcated into 
separate residential, arable and grazing areas; (iii) and, rural villages be established 
to accommodate the families of Africans regularly employed in industry and other 
services who would not be allowed access to neither arable land nor livestock. The 
claim was that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad African farmers, and that the latter 
consists of those who, while with access to land, choose to be in the urban areas and 
leave the land in the poor hands of their female-headed families. But in reality this 
division of the rural population was a guarantee to employers that there will always 
be Africans ready to offer their labour. This group, that is the rural proletariat, 
were to depend for survival on the industrial development that was expected soon 
after the war, as Smit put it: “the proposal is an important link between the 
government’s plan for rehabilitation in the reserves and the large-scale industrial 
development expected soon after the war” (Smit, 1945 in Beinart et al in Klein, 
1980: 299). Unlike the Betterment Proclamation that ignored the man-land ratio, 
the ‘new era’, come to terms with the finding that not all Africans could have a 
claim in land each due to a shortage of land (Smit, 1945: 4 cited in Hendricks, 1990: 
105-6). This division of the rural population represents what have long been the 
interests of the white regimes and the economic interests they sought to safeguard. 
On paper it was a solution the presence of Africans in urban areas that was not only 
growing in numbers, but also threatening to be a permanent phenomenon, and as 
such a means of entrenching the migrant labour system; this is so because, as long 
as such villages were created, proletarianised Africans would have no reason to stay 
in urban areas once their migrant contracts expire because rural villages in the 
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reserves were their homes. But such a division never materialized due to a lack of 
opportunities in wage employment, meaning that in effect everyone who had land 
before this arrangement could not be deprived of such land (Board, 1964: 37).  
 
 Regional Planning Committees were to be established in all native affairs 
zones in order to launch the ‘new era’ (Hendricks, 1990: 107). These P. C.’s, 
consisting of: an agricultural officer, an administrative officer, a soil chemist, a 
surveyor, a draughtsman, clerical staff and the Native Commissioner with an 
African member of the location, would undertake the collection of information and 
statistics, draw up comprehensive plans for the rehabilitation of the area and 
supervise the implementation of the approved plans. Marsberg, the first chairperson 
of the Transkei Planning Committee (TPC), formed in mid-1945, warned that 
rehabilitation would always be delayed if comprehensive plans were drawn while 
there is a shortage of staff to implement them, and accordingly put more emphasis 
on implementation rather than planning. T. G. Cordingley, who succeeded 
Marsberg, took this further by adopting a system of loose planning which required 
very little technical detail, to save both time and resources. Loose Planning took two 
to three days to complete, as exemplified in Shixini location of the Willowvale 
district in the Transkei (McAllister, 1989: 350). 
 
 Loose planning had its own disadvantages that partly contributed to the 
failure of rehabilitation. Firstly, it meant less involvement of the planning and 
implementation processes. Detailed planning did not have this disadvantage since 
plans made in this way had to be approved by the NAD, thus facilitating centralized 
control (Hendricks, 1990). Surely the involvement of the central government carried 
more weight since these schemes were naturally notorious of triggering resistance 
from the people; it is this resistance that central government was more equipped to 
deal with (they had the security police, could enact stringent legislation to name but 
a few). Clearly, this explains why the central government had a bias in favour of 
detailed planning (Hendricks, 1990). 
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2.5. Implementation difficulties and Policy-embedded solutions 
First of all, conservation works were hampered by the strong emphasis that the 
NAD put on planning at the expense of implementation. To illustrate this, while the 
TPC consisted of eight members, the operational team only had three (Hendricks, 
1990: 109). There was also a phenomenal time lag between the declaration of an 
area as a Betterment area, its planning and finally its rehabilitation. For instance 
out of about 900 locations in the Transkei in 1949, 482 were Betterment areas, the 
carrying capacity of only 46 had been assessed and culling of stock had taken place 
in only 26. In addition, the following administrative problems were identified: 
shortage of (i) agricultural staff; (ii) engineering staff; (iii) surveyors; (iv) equipment 
and material; (v) lack of cooperation by the residents and NAD having to bear the 
entire burden; (vi) delays due to centralised authority; (vii) and operational work in 
the hands of magistrates who were unable to give enough time to this work. It seems 
that in spite of the administrative and financial difficulties with which the 
Rehabilitation scheme was fraught, the central government was nevertheless 
determined to implement conservation planning in as many areas as possible. This 
puts across the message that there was more in the interests of government to get 
such areas under its control than to actually conserve the soil and improve 
agriculture (Hendricks, 1990). 
 
 From the 1930’s to the 1940’s, and again in the 1950’s, the history of 
Betterment is marked on the one hand by fierce resistance on the part of the reserve 
population, and on the other by the slow evolution of an altered planning policy 
arising out of the need to deal with this ‘native intransigence’ (Yawitch, 1981: 10-
11). When the Rehabilitation, too, failed the government shifted its policy priorities 
to the elevation of the position of chiefs and headmen by conferring on them 
criminal jurisdictions and empowering them to issue orders (Hendricks, 1990: 114). 
Tightened administrative control over chiefs, however, was a prerequisite for them 
to become a channel for Rehabilitation. For example, the UTTGC, adopting an 
attitude similar to that of the NAD that Africans resisted Rehabilitation because of 
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traditionalism, accepted the rehabilitation scheme behind the backs of the people 
themselves (Hendricks, 1990). 
 
 The acceptance of the scheme by the co-opted tribal authorities saw strong 
resistance from the people of the reserves. This resistance was spearheaded be the 
All African Convention (AAC) which had published a pamphlet entitled 
‘Rehabilitation: the new fraud’ which viewed the scheme against the background of 
government’s policy that put Africans at the mercy of white capital as cheap 
labourers by depriving them of the land (Tabata, 1950). The AAC’s influence was so 
influential that it convinced the people to resist both the scheme and the tribal 
authorities that accepted it. Consequently, in some locations people formed village 
committees against their headmen and in the Mount Ayliff district of the Transkei 
an organization called the Kongo held meetings in the hills, bypassed and even 
killed some of their headmen (the killing of headmen also took place in other areas 
as well such as Sekhukhuneland). In other places the reaction of the people was to 
cut down fences erected in terms of the scheme and to drive in their cattle overnight 
(Beinart et al in Klein, 1980). The response of the government to this was the usual 
use of force by means of the army, arrests and imposition of harsh sentences on 
those who were convicted. But the significance of this resistance was that it put the 
message across to the government officials that the people realized the real 
intentions of the scheme, which were not to improve agriculture but rather to 
regiment the migrant labour system for the white economy.      
 
 With this resistance coming from the people, new and more stringent 
legislative powers were needed if the scheme was to be implemented. To this end, in 
1949 the more lenient 1939 proclamation was replaced by the harsher Proclamation 
No. 116 of 1949 which gave Native Commissioners wide-ranging powers to: (i) 
appropriate any land unit if such land was required for reclamation; (ii) institute a 
compulsory cull if necessary; (iii) and could also control the general agricultural 
progress in the Betterment areas (Proclamation No. 116 of 1949: 403 cited in 
Hendricks, 1990: 118). To further erode resistance, however, the government used 
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two pieces of legislation: the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and Proclamation No. 
180 of 1956 (amendment to the 1949 Proclamation) which both stated that 
Betterment areas were to be declared after mere explanation to the Tribal Authority 
or the people themselves by the Native Commissioner. Thus, as Bantu Authorities 
found themselves the sole representatives of the people, consultation gave way to 
mere explanation.  
 
2.6. The Tomlinson Commission and subsequent Government Reserve Policies 
When the National Party (NP) came into power in May 1948, it proceeded to 
implement its policy of [grand] apartheid that formed the major plank of its election 
platform (Sachs, 1965: 83). Faced with increased African political activity that was 
hard to control by the use of force alone, the NP looked to the reserves as its major 
solution (Platzky et al, 1985). The reserves provided a place where urbanized 
Africans could be deported and controlled politically. Once again their carrying 
capacity would have to be ascertained for this particular purpose. But it must be 
pointed out that Africans would not be sent to the reserves for good, but would 
remain there as long as their labour was not needed in the white areas. 
Alternatively, they would be allowed in the white areas for the duration of their 
migrant labour contracts. 
 
 But, as Hindson (1986: i) points out, the belief that Africans could only be 
allowed in urban areas for the duration of their migrant labour contracts was based 
on an apartheid fiction- and is fundamentally different from the way things worked 
out in practice. In his explanation of the development of pass laws and their impact 
on the urban labour market, Hindson shows how the pass system and influx 
controls actually resulted in a differentiation between Africans who were migrant 
labourers and those who were to be allowed in urban areas permanently. This 
differentiation was based on the rights to urban residence for those born in urban 
areas, were continuously working and staying there on the one hand, as well as 
those whose migrant labour contracts prevented them from staying in urban areas 
when unemployed, and as such maintained links with the rural areas. The result 
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was that these two groups were also channeled into different labour markets. From 
the 1970’s this distinction has since broken down, and in its place came a 
replacement of long distance migration by commuter belts on the peripheries of 
urban areas (mostly squatter camps). Consequently urban Africans were 
differentiated by both occupational status and class (Hindson, 1986); so there was 
never such a thing as a complete prevention of African settlement in urban areas.      
 
To ascertain the state of the reserves, the NP government appointed the 
Tomlinson Commission on 1 November 1950. This commission consisted of eleven 
persons and its terms of reference were “to conduct an enquiry into and to report on a 
comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native areas with a view to 
developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native and 
based on effective socio-economic planning” (Tomlinson, 1954:  cited in Houghton, 
1956: 1). It reported in October 1954 with its recommendations entailing a technical 
solution to the problem in the reserves. Like Smit in 1945, Tomlinson recommended 
the division of the rural population into two groups, one based on the land and 
farming progressively in what was termed ‘economic farming units’ (EFU’s), and 
the other dependent on wage labour with no rights to the land (Tomlinson, 1954). 
While those in EFU’s were never again to desire to become migrant workers, the 
families in rural villages were to depend on migrant labour wages on a full time 
basis (Nieuwenhuysen, 1964: 24). 
 
 In its report the commission argued that land shortage was the main problem 
of reserve agriculture. Having heard that 120 pounds were necessary for an African 
to make a living out of full-time farming, the commission used this figure to 
determine the size of arable allotments and concluded that at least 80% of the 
reserve population will have to be removed from the reserves. After interviewing 
some 900 Bantu farmers with an average income of 56, 60 pounds, Tomlinson 
decided to adopt this figure as a basis for determining the size of arable allotments, 
despite the fact that this figure was based on the currently low productivity levels of 
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the Bantu (De Wet, 1995). Land was to be held on freehold for the Africans to have 
pride in farming. 
 
 But the South African government rejected these recommendations outright. 
The idea of EFU’s never materialized as neither was the overhauling of the land 
tenure system from communal to freehold tenure (Hendricks, 1989). Instead of 
EFU’s, land holders were allocated land as small as one-sixth of an EFU, and 
concerning land tenure, it was tribal authorities, under what was now called the 
department of Bantu administration and development, who were entrusted with the 
responsibility over the Africans land tenure. So the same state of affairs of families 
clinging to unproductive plots in the reserves such that they simultaneously 
depended on wage labour was favoured at the expense of full time farming. But 
exactly why did the central government pursue this sort of policy for the reserves is 
a question that still remains to be answered. 
 
It has been quite rightly pointed that there has always been a correlation 
between the government reserve policies as pursued by the South African 
government and the role of the reserves in the South African economy (De Wet, 
1987). By this correlation it is meant that the policies that the South African 
government pursued in respect of the reserve areas were compatible with the role 
that such a government had envisaged for the inhabitants of the reserves in thee 
white Economy as the following discussion will show. For instance, Mbeki (1964) 
has pointed out that ‘the role of the reserves has always been twofold: to produce 
and reproduce surplus [cheap] labour for white agriculture, mining and industry on 
the one hand, and to receive those whose labour was no longer needed in the white 
economy’. So this in a way explains why full time farming in the reserves was never 
prioritized in government policies since the reserves only needed to produce a 
proportion of what Africans needed to survive while the rest of their subsistence 
would be provided through migrant labour remittances. In this way the reserves 
were a place where migrant labourers could be picked up, a home for those 
labourers no longer needed in the white economy and their families as well as a 
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means of subsidising the low wages which formed the base of the cheap labour 
system. But the increasing presence of Africans in urban areas surely undermined 
this role of the reserves. Such increasing African presence in urban areas had also 
been fueled by large-scale mechanisation and consolidation of white farms that had 
rendered thousands of farm workers redundant. As such, new policies had to be put 
in place to deal with this state of affairs.  
 
 To this end the NP government, from the 1960’s through to the 1980’s, 
embarked on a policy of forced removals of Africans who were then resettled in the 
reserves. Affecting up to 3, 5 million souls (Platzky et al, 1985: 9), forced removals 
swelled the reserve population and worsened the deprivation that was already the 
order of the day. The ideology behind these removals was that of preserving the 
migrant labour system, and in themselves the removals were a solution to a number 
of problems. First, they made necessary the removal of Africans from urban areas- 
a solution to the political threat posed by urban Africans. Secondly they made 
possible the large-scale removal of redundant farm workers, in a way making it easy 
for the farming capital to deal with these former workers. And thirdly they were a 
means of doing away with portions of land under African ownership but outside the 
reserves (Black Spots).  Thus, by denying Africans easy urban access and settlement 
while simultaneously swelling the ranks of the reserve population, this policy 
reinforced the system of migrant labour. Moreover, the reserves were not only to 
become dumping grounds for unwanted Africans in urban areas, but also the places 
where Africans could be controlled politically, the latter function of which was 
reinforced by the creation of Bantustans (self-governing and independent states) in 
which Africans were to rule themselves. As a result of this policy, the white privilege 
of preserving urban areas for themselves was secured, the problem of what to do 
with unwanted farm labour was dealt with, and the remaining pockets of land 
under African ownership but outside the reserves were done away with in ways 
which entrenched the migrant labour system.   
 
2.7. Conclusion 
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 In this chapter it has been shown how the Betterment and Rehabilitation schemes 
were used to disguise policies that in effect went far beyond mere soil conservation. 
These were the policies of assembling Africans for the cheap labour needs of the 
white economy by regimenting the migrant labour system since the historic land 
dispossessions. The introduction of soil conservation is treated here as a response to 
the collapse of the migrant labour system caused by the deterioration in the reserve 
land conditions. By denying Africans more land and further threatening the 
diminution of their livestock, the Betterment scheme, which was the first 
government effort to conserve the soil, showed the commitment of the government 
to the migrant labour system. Moreover, this system of labour was further 
reinforced by the Rehabilitation scheme that dealt with urban Africans by 
instituting new land use arrangements in the reserves. These policies, despite their 
ineffectiveness as far as soil conservation is concerned, were pursued at the expense 
of policy alteration that was triggered by the resistance of the reserve populations. 
Lastly, after the Tomlinson Commission of 1954 which urged the cutting down of 
the reserve population for the purposes of having a full time farming population, the 
NP government embarked on a policy of forced removals of Africans from urban 
areas, white farms and black spots into the reserves, in a way making even more 
Africans dependent on the migrant labour system.  
  
In the following chapter the Rehabilitation scheme in particular will be 
discussed in relation to one particular area, called Mission location in Butterworth, 
Transkei, in order to demonstrate how it divided the people of that area by taking 
away the land from some but not from others, as well as the consequent inability of 
those deprived to depend on agriculture for livelihood. Needless to say, this will 
demonstrate that dependence on wage labour in the reserves was however 
inevitable.    
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Chapter Three 
 3. The Rehabilitation Scheme in Mission Location 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter dwells on the Rehabilitation scheme as introduced and carried out in 
Mission location, Butterworth. When Mr. W. Wakeford, the resident magistrate, 
visited the area to introduce an agricultural demonstrator in 1944, he referred 
briefly to soil conservation and rehabilitation (Wakeford, 1944: 2/32/5/25). Though 
the people accepted the scheme, they were nevertheless afraid that some new 
undesirable things might come up. For instance, they wanted no changes in the 
location’s leadership structure as they stressed that ‘the headman must be there 
with his committee’ and that ‘agricultural officers must not come and take control’; 
they also wanted the rights of the people to remain, especially those of land 
ownership particularly in the face of changes to result from the scheme (Wakeford, 
1944/ 2/36/5/25: 1-2). These points were raised by a committee elected by the local 
residents with the headman as its chairman with the purpose of informing 
Wakeford about their acceptance of the scheme or, in the words of the committee 
itself, to ‘ask the government to take over their location for the purpose of carrying 
out complete rehabilitation’. Wakeford, who congratulated the people for what he 
referred to as a ‘quest for improved conditions’, soon informed the Chief Magistrate 
of the Transkei (CMT), Mr. De Villiers, and firmly stressed that the request should 
be taken at once. The way he urged the CMT- for instance, ‘this is too good an 
opportunity to be missed’- somehow shows that the benefit from the scheme was to 
be more for the government than the people themselves, a point that coincides with 
the persistent argument of this chapter.         
 
 In line with Mr. Wakeford’s persuasive letter, the Transkei Planning 
Committee (TPC), set up in 1945 by the South African government to survey areas 
for rehabilitation purposes, surveyed the area in the period between 23 July and 6 
December 1945 (TPC 2/36/5/25/ 1946: 1). The seven members making up the 
committee were:  Mr: F. H. Marsberg, the chairman; F. R. B. Thompson, the 
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agricultural member; W. A. S. Norton, the engineer; H. Klintworth, the soil 
chemist; W. Wilson, the surveyor; W. Wakeford, the resident magistrate; and C. W. 
Monakali, the representative of the local people. Guided by the statement entitled  
“Agricultural and Pastoral Rehabilitation Planning Scheme”, in January 1946 the 
Committee concluded its thirty-six page report, and in July 1947 Rehabilitation 
works officially started. It must be pointed out that all the material used in this 
chapter was obtained from the Cape Archives in Cape Town. 
 
 The chapter commences with a brief summary of the Committee’s findings 
and recommendations, mainly focusing on population and settlement, the physical 
structure, distribution and use of the land as well as the way the committee’s 
recommendations were to be implemented. Then it goes in detail to what is termed 
the implications of these recommendations for agriculture in the area, mainly 
arguing that to all intents and purposes, the scheme had the overall effect of 
reducing both the size and extent of land available for cultivation, with the result 
that more families were to depend on wage labour, a practice that was in line with 
the policies of making the African reserve areas reservoirs of cheap migrant labour 
discussed in the previous chapter. Moreover, to make sure that this intention was 
fulfilled, the scheme had the element of being forced on the people by tightening 
government control over them, in a way dealing with potential resistance.       
 
3.2. The Planning Committee’s Report: Findings and Recommendations 
 3.2.1. Population and Settlement 
With the purpose of stabilising the African population, by 1920 the Cape 
administration had demarcated 424 kraal sites for occupation by: (i) registered 
holders under quitrent title deeds; (ii) by married sons of those registered holders 
under certificate of occupation; (iii) and by people to whom special permission to 
occupy was given by the resident magistrate (TPC 2/36/5/25, 1946: 9). The 
difference between these different types of tenure is that those with title deeds had 
more security over the land they occupied as confirmed by their holding of title 
deeds- but such security was however subject to their ability to pay annual quitrent. 
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With the other two forms of tenure, however, there was less security since it was just 
a permission to occupy with no title deed to confirm registration. The Planning 
committee made two observations about these kraal sites, and in its view such 
observations were undesirable. These were: (i) that these kraal sites were too large; 
(ii) and that they were so scattered that, though altogether they totaled 279 hectares, 
they were allocated over an area of 907 hectares. The committee then recommended 
‘the transformation of’ what it called ‘a crazy pattern of residence into a systematic 
layout’. As it will be revealed in the course of this chapter, by this the committee 
meant both the reduction (in size) and the concentration of these kraal sites.     
 
In 1945 there were 616 families, consisting of 2 385 individuals in Mission 
location belonging to two main sub-groups of the Southern Nguni tribe. The first 
group is of Xhosa origin and seems to have been the descendants and remnants of 
one of the clans making up the tribe under Chief Hintsa who lived there in former 
times. But the assertion that the people have lived there since the former times must 
be treated with caution especially since the boundaries of the territory occupied by 
the Xhosas have been expanded almost in every generation as a result of (i) the 
departure of sons of reigning chiefs who went to find their own chiefdoms; (ii) as a 
result of wars between rival Xhosa chiefs claiming the same chiefdom (for example 
between two or more sons of a particular chief or between the rightful son and a 
regent); (iii) and also as a result of wars between the Xhosas and the colonists who 
sought to dispossess the former of land and other resources (Peires, 1981). To this 
end it is best to say that these people finally settled in the area. The second group 
has no common affinities but seems to be made up of Africans attracted to the 
Mission seeking asylum under past Missionaries and are generally of Mfengu 
descent (TPC/2/36/5/25/ 1946: 8).   
 
 The missionaries were mainly the Wesleyan Methodists founded in 1837 and 
who have exercised jurisdiction over an area of 8 000 morgen on which some 
Africans have over time been allowed to settle, some of which became Christians 
and acknowledged the authority of the Missionary. With the exception of the 
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Methodist mission, in 1945 Mission location was trust land (under the auspices of 
the South African Native Trust), and Mr. C. W. Monakali was the government 
appointed headman.  
  
         
 3.2.2. The Physical condition, distribution and use of the land in 1945 
Table 1: Land distribution and use in 1945: 
 
Distribution:   
 
A. Arable land: Total No. of families.     With arable land.    Without arable land
                      
.     
616                              260                             356
                         
   
B. Dwelling sites: 
                                    
Families with sites.               Lodgers.              On parental sites        
      
                424                               35                               157                 
Concerning the physical condition, the committee found that most of the land in the 
area had been lost to erosion as a result of its being excessively cultivated, very steep 
in slope as well as being very shallow in depth. In turn it recommended that such 
land should not be put under the plough anymore.  
 
 As a requirement of the land allocations that finally took place in 1920, 
people had to pay the costs of survey and stamp duty in order for land to be 
allocated to them despite the fact that they already had land in their occupation 
prior to this arrangement (CMT, 1912, 57/58 Vol. 12). However, the inability of 
some people to pay such survey dues as well as the natural increase in population 
meant that by 1945, of the 616 families only 260 enjoyed access to an arable 
allotment, 424 were on their dwelling sites, while 35 were lodgers; and a further 157 
lived on parental sites (TPC/ 2/36/5/25, 1946: 24). This meant that 57 percent of 
families (or 356 out of 616) had no arable land. 
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 The 4 906-hectare total area of Mission location in 1945 was used thus: (i) 
279 hectares were for dwelling sites and cultivated kraal gardens issued in a 
disorganized manner (as stated above); (ii) 1 707 hectares were arable lands which 
were issued regardless of suitability of soil types, slopes, erodibility and limits of 
cultivation such that most were situated on excessively steep slopes and 
consequently had to be eliminated from the arable category. Both the elimination of 
arable lands (the total number of which is stated in the following sub-section) as well 
as the reduction in the size of cultivated kraal gardens for concentration purposes 
were the heaviest blows to hit the people of Mission location, as it will be argued 
below; (iii) and, 2 919 hectares of overgrazed veld accommodated 1 306 large stock 
which were deemed in excess of the committee’s recommended carrying capacity of 
one large stock unit per five acres (TPC/ 2/36/5/25, 1946). In contrast, in Mission 
location today the residential areas are clearly demarcated and concentrated in a 
place chosen in terms of the Rehabilitation scheme, as are the arable and grazing 
lands. But the clear demarcation of both the arable and grazing lands is now 
blurred by the absence of fencing that was instrumental in such a demarcation but 
has now perished. 
 
 Guided by what it termed the ‘unbalanced diet’ of the people that was up to 
75 percent maize and shockingly deficient in both protein and vitamin nutrients, the 
committee went on to design what it termed a future system of farming mainly 
recommending the: (i) improvement of livestock grades to provide better milk and 
meat; (ii) growing of green vegetables to supply vitamin nutrients; (iii) creation of a 
large diversion bank above all lands to dispose of flood waters; (iv) establishment of 
a three-year system of crop rotation to avoid mono-cropping; (v) creation of 
artificial pastures and grass leys; (vi) and tremendous use of commercial fertilizers 
(TPC/ 2/36/5/25, 1946: 17-21).  
 
 3.2.3. Implementation of the Committee’s Recommendations 
Regarding the style of implementing the committee’s recommendations, five points 
are worth mentioning here. These are: (i) Rehabilitation and soil conservation in 
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general should be incorporated into the education system of Africans; (ii) failure to 
cooperate with the scheme was to see the people being compelled to do so by an 
army of officials; (iii) the need for firm administrative control to foster cooperation; 
(iv) the need for legislative sanction to do away with the few who would want to 
deviate from the scheme’s recommendations; (v) and the inability of the people to 
question the Department of Native Affairs about its implementation procedures 
(TPC/ 2/36/5/25, 1946: 32-33). As it will be more elaborately discussed in the course 
of this chapter, the impression made by these five points is that of strong 
determination on the part of the government to implement rehabilitation in the area 
regardless of the extent of resistance staged by the people in objection to the scheme, 
or parts thereof.  
  
In January 1947 the recommendations of the TPC were approved in respect 
of the following seven matters: the proposals for: (a) the blocking out of arable, 
grazing and residential areas; (b) stock water supplies; (c) improved farming 
methods, land and veld usage subject to such variations as may from time to time be 
deemed necessary; (d) fencing and other works; (e) afforestation; (f) the provision of 
additional arable land to replace excised land; and (g) limitation of stock (Secretary 
of Native Affairs, 1947/ No. 8/432/13.). The approval of these recommendations, 
especially the one in (f) above, meant that the fact that 14 families were to be left 
without land despite such new land to be made available was being approved by the 
central government itself. In July of the same year Rehabilitation works were 
officially started. By February 1948, the last date from the Cape Archives records, 
fencing had covered 58 093 yards. 
 
3.3. Implications of the Report for Agriculture in the area 
 First of all, the observation that excessive cultivation, steepness of slope and 
shallowness resulted to a substantial portion of the soil in the area being lost to 
erosion had some adverse effects on the practice of agriculture. To illustrate this, 
where soil was badly eroded what the committee recommended was that such land 
should not be put under the plough. This however is hardly surprising given the fact 
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that the Rehabilitation scheme’s architects had a tendency to characterize some 
Africans as ‘good’ and others as ‘bad’ farmers. The former were seen as progressive 
farmers to whom access to arable land could be confined, while the latter were seen 
as lazy men and were deemed not fit of having access to land (Yawitch in Cross & 
Haines, 1988: 106). One implication of this conception was that not all Africans 
could have access to arable land; and as a matter of fact those who were denied 
access could only make a living by means of wage labour.        
 
As this chapter will show later, the unavailability of adequate alternative 
land meant that such people were being driven out of agriculture as a source of 
livelihood. In this way they were adding to an already existing class of landless 
people in the area since, as it will be shown below, already about 57% of people had 
no arable land. So in short, without any land to cultivate, the people of Mission 
location were deliberately being denied the wherewithal to make a living from 
agriculture. To use Bundy’s (1979: 227) words, this was an acceptance [by the South 
African government] of a creation of a large class of landless workers. 
 
 By 1945, however, already some 356 of the 616 families in Mission location 
had no access to arable land. From this it can be inferred that already by then 
landlessness was acute in the area especially due to the fact that the majority of 
families (57%) had no arable land. Now with the introduction of the Rehabilitation 
scheme that further swelled this landless group, this chapter does not hesitate in 
seeing such a scheme not at all in the so-called light of improving agriculture as 
claimed by its architects, but rather in what is seen here as the scheme’s real 
intentions of minimizing the number of families with access to arable land.          
 
 Furthermore, it is asserted here that having such a large number of families 
without arable land was inevitable in an area that was faced with natural increases 
in both the human and livestock populations but with hardly any land to make 
room for further expansion. This was the case in Mission location where it appears 
that hardly any new arable land was allocated to landless families after the 1908-20 
 36 
allocations (this is elaborately dealt with in Chapter four). In fact, this is hardly 
surprising when viewed against the background of the policies of successive South 
African governments that aimed at minimising the amount of land in the African 
reserves so as to deprive Africans of an opportunity to subsist fully from the land. 
The historical conquest and dispossessions, the parliamentary legislations that 
brought about the historic land Acts of 1913 and 1936, as well as the so called 
conservation schemes that form a central part of this chapter were very 
instrumental in bringing about this state of affairs. In this connection De Wet (1987: 
102) is right when he argues that Betterment and Rehabilitation schemes must be 
understood within the context of broader historic South African government 
policies of minimizing the amount of land for blacks and when he says that the 
failure of these schemes is based on their reluctance to question the unequal 
allocation of land brought about by such historic policies.  
 
 Having observed that ‘the original survey of arable lands was carried out 
without any technical guidance in regard to suitability of soil types, slopes, 
erodibility, natural features in some cases, and limits of cultivation’ (TPC/ 2/36/5/25, 
1946: 13), the committee proceeded to make recommendations which, it is asserted 
here, had the most far-reaching implications for the few people with access to arable 
land in the area. To be more specific, in its report, the committee asserts that: ‘every 
land in the location has been thoroughly examined in loco with the result that the 
committee recommends the elimination of 53 whole lands and portions of 60 others 
from cultivation’ [out of the 260 total arable lands]. Hence, the number of families 
without access to arable land was increased from 356 to 409, meaning that more 
families were being completely denied the wherewithal to practice agriculture. This 
is so in view of the fact that if these people have been using this land as a source of 
livelihood from the land, surely taking such land away from them amounted to a 
complete denial of their such means of livelihood. Again, once more this serves to 
show just what the real intentions of the Rehabilitation scheme were: dividing the 
rural population into those with, and those without arable land. As if this was not 
enough, 60 more people were to have their allotments reduced. Though a 
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recommendation was made in the committee’s report for 24 new allotments of 5 
acres each and 12 more of the same extent to be purchased from the Methodist 
Mission in the area, this was still to leave 14 more families who had land before the 
scheme landless. Surely the future of these families was not at all in agriculture but, 
as Smit had envisaged, in wage labour (Statement of Land Policy, 1945). But, as 
Board (1964: 37) has pointed out, “the changeover from the traditional rural 
economy, where there was theoretically room for every family, to an economy where 
farming and wage earning in secondary and tertiary industries is typical, has been 
held up by the lack of opportunities outside of part time, semi-subsistence farming 
in the African sector of the economy and wage earning in the white economy”.  In 
fact, the committee does acknowledge its uncertainty as to future industrial 
development in South Africa as a whole in its report, but what is so striking about 
its recommendations is the way it proceeds to force more people out of agriculture 
as a source of livelihood. The argument put forward in this chapter about such a 
decision to go ahead with forcing people out of agriculture is that: such a decision 
was always going to be inevitable in a scheme that was guided by the ideology as 
well as the practice of maximizing the supply of cheap labour whose supply was 
based on the abundance of Africans in the reserves. So rather than creating 
opportunities for the people of Mission location, the Rehabilitation scheme 
prioritized the cheap supply of migrant labour by depriving as many families as 
possible of land. 
 
 To cover up the loss of land, the committee haphazardly encouraged some 
form of cooperative farming, by which it did not make clear whether land holding 
and use were to become joint ventures or some were to become servants for others. 
The committee made this recommendation in view of the observation that arable 
land in the area was held on the basis of individual quitrent tenure and because it 
intended to ‘use the land as a composite and to seek the greatest benefit of the 
greatest number of people’ (TPC 2/36/5/25, 1946: 25). But all in all, in the case of 
Mission location, the kind of relationship that was to develop was to be 
characterized by a group of those with access to arable land on the one hand, and 
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that of those with no land whatsoever on the other, especially since no real change 
was eventually made in the nature of tenure. Changing tenurial arrangements 
surely was not in the interests of the government since that could have tempered 
with the role and position of chiefs in land allocation, and this was not desired in 
government quarters because chiefs were very instrumental in the success of the 
entire scheme. The failure to overhaul the nature of tenure meant that what the 
committee merely did was to encourage those few who were lucky enough to still 
have arable land to try and accommodate those without land, but the way this was 
done was so vague that it is not clear how it was going to work. Furthermore, this in 
no was did cover up for the loss of land than just making the landless the burden of 
those with land. 
 
 Regarding the size and location of kraal sites, the committee recommended 
that, ‘in view of the largeness and the scattered nature of some building areas, there 
is no doubt that from the grazing point of view, greater concentration is advisable so 
as to open up grazing areas’ (TPC 2/36/5/25, 1946:17). This recommendation had a 
negative impact on the size of kraal gardens since in effect concentration went along 
with reduction. Such gardens, though serving as a supplementary source of 
livelihood from agriculture in the case of families with an arable allotment, were the 
only such source for families without an arable allotment- that were a majority in 
the case of Mission location. In effect their already limited land was being reduced, 
and as a result their source of livelihood from the land was considerably being 
diminished. In this connection I tend to agree with McAllister (1989: 362) in his 
assertion that ‘one of the deficiencies of Betterment schemes is the smallness in the 
size of gardens available in the new residential areas (about 46 square meters or 0, 
25 hectares) and that such smallness is particularly severe in the case of families 
without an arable allotment’.  
 
 Though the committee went as far as recommending a future system of 
farming for the people of the area, it nevertheless left unanswered some of central 
questions that are here deemed essential in the improvement of African agriculture. 
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To illustrate this, the report went a long way in recommending diversion banks and 
contour ploughing that indeed can reclaim the physical structure of the soil, but still 
failed to tackle the question of affordability of quality inputs into agriculture to 
which it made strong reference. It is a well known fact that the quality of one’s 
technology, seed and fertilizer is essential for the best results from agriculture, and 
that the more improved these are, the higher the cost of affording them. In actual 
fact Africans (as it will be shown in chapter four) were not in a position to afford the 
best of these since their agriculture did not make any meaningful cash returns. But 
strangely the committee does not raise this point in its report, even though it 
strongly recommends the improvement of inputs such as fertilizers to improve 
African agriculture. To this end, it can be pointed out that more still needed to be 
done to improve agriculture in Mission location than mere Rehabilitation schemes 
which focused on reclaiming the soil physically while Africans increasingly found it 
almost impossible to cling to such agriculture even for their barest subsistence 
needs. 
 
 The committee further raised an interesting point about a shortage of able- 
bodied individuals who were not available for agricultural work in the area as it was 
the case in Transkei as a whole. The report put the estimate at 250 000 individuals 
every year in the whole of Transkei, a figure which had not changed much by 1969 
according to Horrell’s (1969: 118) finding of 233 000 individuals. Having raised such 
a crucial point, however, the committee failed to qualify it by acknowledging that 
more people were being attracted to wage labour because in the first place they were 
unable to fully subsist by agriculture. For Houghton (1964: 97) this is a result of an 
increase in population which saw primitive agriculture being unable to feed the 
people; in short, the exclusion of people from agriculture to use Leeuwenburg’s 
(1977: 7) words.  
 
But this is more complex than it sounds, as according to Wolpe (1972: 433) 
such exclusion had much to do with the overwhelming success of the economic and 
political power of the white capitalist sector over the African economy that led to the 
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latter economy being unable to produce a surplus. The consequence of this was a 
situation by which the relationship between these two economies was reduced to the 
provision of surplus labour to the white economy by the Africans. Such labour was 
provided on a migrant (and temporary, if not periodic) basis. The basis of the 
migrant labour system was the retention of access to some means of production 
(land) in the reserves by the migrants and their families so as to subsidise the low 
wages the employers paid. It is therefore this land that could not be fully utilized in 
Mission location because able-bodied individuals were away at work. In short, 
taking part in migrant labour is pre-determined by historical conditions that have 
resulted in the institutionalisation of the migrant labour system (May, 1987: 124).  
 
 The determination of the government to implement the Rehabilitation 
scheme notwithstanding both its implications as well as the reaction of the people 
again can be seen as  means to guarantee the benefits that were to derive from the 
scheme on the part of the state, and not that of the people. This is evident in how the 
state prepared itself to force the scheme on the people and how the local leadership 
structure was to be co-opted to this end, as the following five points from the report 
suggest: (i) once the people accepted the scheme, the district magistrate told them 
that they would not be able to question the Department of Native Affairs about its 
implementation practices; (ii) secondly people who failed to cooperate were to be 
dealt with by an army of officials, meaning that they were going to be forced to 
cooperate; (iii) the headman was vested with powers to inflict criminal sanctions on 
offenders in what was termed tightened administrative control; (iv) legislative 
sanction was sought to maintain uniformity of cooperation; (v) and lastly, soil 
conservation (of which rehabilitation was part) was to form a central component of 
the African school curriculum. From these points, however, it can be seen how the 
central government prepared itself to deal with potential resistance to the scheme. 
Of most concern is the use of the headman of the area against his own subjects. 
Needless to say, whatever the scheme was to achieve once it was implemented, the 
government, by using the five points raised above to pursue interests other than 
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improving agriculture for the benefit of the people of Mission location, had 
somehow tightened the grip of control over the people of the area. 
 
3.4. Conclusions 
In this chapter it has been shown how the Rehabilitation scheme, which was 
introduced and carried out in Mission location for the so-called purpose of 
improving agriculture, showed up to be one of the South African government 
strategies to make as many Africans as possible available as cheap labourers in the 
white areas. This was shown by pointing out that: the bulk of the arable land in the 
area was deemed excessively cultivated and consequently badly eroded, and the 
subsequent recommendation was the curtailment of any further cultivation on those 
lands. This effectively deprived people of arable land. In this connection an 
enormous amount of land was eliminated from the arable category with no adequate 
alternative land for agriculture, and to make things worse the concentration of 
kraal sites reduced the size of cultivated kraal gardens, in most cases the only hope 
of eking out an existence from agriculture in the area. As the Committee pointed out 
in its report, migrant labour already played a central role in livelihoods in the area 
because, this chapter argued, agriculture was not being able to meet this 
requirement. In addition, the future system of farming it recommended was to be 
forced on the people because the scheme was actually intended for purposes other 
than improving agriculture.  
 
As the next chapter will show, landlessness and dependence on wage labour 
have been so entrenched on the people of Mission location that when those few with 
access to arable land were no longer able to make use of it (as a result of old age, 
death of livestock, etc.), their descendants had already abandoned the culture of 
land cultivation for a living on the one hand, and had been so accustomed to other 
means of livelihood on the other, even to the point of finding no use for those arable 
allotments even though some were entitled to inherit them. The result has been a 
considerable decline in agriculture dating in some cases back to more than three 
decades. Such decline was also aggravated by the need for more cash to practice 
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agriculture, a requirement that was not easily met by the unviable sources financial 
sources available to Africans ( for example, the low wages of migrants that hardly 
even meet the minimum needs for a family’s subsistence). 
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Chapter Four 
4. Agriculture in Mission Location today 
   “A case of decline” 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter throws light on the present state of agriculture in Mission location. 
Data used here are based on visits made to twenty-one homesteads in the area who, 
out of a total of 118 households, are the only ones who, in one way or another, 
happen to enjoy access to an ‘intsimi’ (an arable allotment). 17 of these were 
successfully interviewed while four happened to be headed by absentee landlords, 
and as such could not be interviewed. The interviews were based on 14 structured 
questions and the responses were recorded by means of a tape recorder.   
 
 The basic argument of this chapter is based on a finding that there has been 
a remarkable decline in agriculture (both in terms of land cultivation and livestock 
ownership) in the area. This was revealed by first looking at the question of access to 
land and the nature of tenure; what transpired is that, out of a total of 118 
households (a household meaning people leaving in a particular residential site) 
Bhongoza, which is but one residential area in Mission location, only nineteen are 
registered holders of an ‘intsimi’. It was further discovered that these registered 
holders have inherited these ‘amasimi’ mainly from their parents who have held 
them since the early 20th
 
 century land allocations mentioned in chapter three. From 
this however it appears that very little or no arable land has been allocated to the 
landless since these historic allocations. This means that some ninety-nine 
households, however, have no stake in arable agriculture. 
 Secondly, the chapter looks at the extent of land cultivation in the area- both 
in amasimi and iigadi. It is revealed that out of the entire population of the area, 
including the 21 households visited, only three are engaged in some regular 
cultivation of amasimi, two of which cultivate on land they are renting or simply 
borrowing from the non-cultivators who are registered land holders. Of the fourteen 
registered land-holding households who are currently not engaging in any 
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cultivation, six (despite being roughly between forty and sixty years of age) have not 
themselves engaged in any cultivation, citing mainly the decline of livestock and the 
lack of cash to afford the necessary inputs as their reasons. In contrast, the three 
regular cultivators are on the opposite end of the spectrum; though two are not 
registered holders of arable allotments, they have managed to get access by means of 
renting from, and by simply negotiating with some registered holders three and five 
morgen allotments respectively. In addition, they can afford the necessary inputs 
which now require cash; all three of them have their own tractors, the services of 
which are employed by many people in their gardens (and not in the ‘amasimi’) and 
significant cash returns (up to R 150 per garden) are made from such an activity, 
and they also make some livestock sales in addition; they also employ wage 
labourers especially for hoeing; and, all of them reported that they do sell part of 
their good produce. In this connection the chapter argues that: as a result of land 
shortages in the area, a considerable number of people, including those entitled to 
inherit an ‘intsimi’, have tended to seek means of livelihood other than agriculture. 
When the traditional ways of practicing agriculture were no longer viable- for 
instance as a result of decline in livestock and the resultant need for cash- those who 
were entitled to inheritance were discouraged from pursuing an agricultural 
livelihood mainly because they hardly earned enough to invest in arable agriculture, 
let alone being able to fully subsist from such cash-based sources. The result was 
engagement in such livelihood sources in order to survive at all, and the prospect of 
getting back to the land fell apart- thus the high number of uncultivated allotments. 
Seemingly this inability to cultivate the bigger amasimi is compensated by the 
cultivation of ‘iigadi’ which, though about 150 rands has to be paid for a tractor, are 
regularly cultivated as the only source of an agricultural livelihood. 
 
 Lastly, the ownership of livestock confirms the finding that livestock has 
declined in the area; only 5 out of 21households own a total of 44 cattle between 
them, and three of these are the regular cultivators who respectively own the 
majority of the herds, 32 of the total number between them respectively. With the 
exception of goats, these three households own all other livestock (sheep, pigs and 
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fowls) in most cases the majority of herds. (For further illustration, this is tabulated 
in a special page that contains the tables.)  
 
Seemingly a lot of agricultural activity takes place in the homesteads of these 
three regular cultivators. They plough other people’s gardens for cash; they can 
make stock sales and can acquire and maintain more livestock, and in addition can 
make cash from the sale of agricultural products to the extent that a self-
perpetuating cycle of agricultural activity is established, with the availability of cash 
at its center. Regarding the rest of the landholders, absence of cash and meaningful 
income is the primary cause of their failure to engage in agriculture- and as such 
accounts for a decline in agriculture. This state of affairs is in contrast with the 
findings of the TPC in 1945 that mainly cited poor ways of farming that led to soil 
erosion as the major cause of poor agricultural productivity. In a way, it shows that 
the TPC indeed ignored the question of financial backing in the practice of 
agriculture. 
 
But first it is important to start with a table that illustrates (i) the extent of 
access to land; (ii) the individual/s who actually holds the land at present; (iii) the 
extent of cultivation of ‘amasimi’; (iv) cultivation of ‘iigadi’; (vi) and the total 
number of livestock and its distribution between families as discussed throughout 
the chapter. 
 
Table Two: 
(i) Total No. of:   
                                   
Households.   Access to land.   Registered holders.   Unregistered.            
(ii) Holders:         
    118                    21                           19                                2 
   
Widows.                                Heirs.                              Unconfirmed. 
(iii) Allotments:   
7                                         10                                                4 
   
Total No.                            Cultivated.                         Uncultivated. 
(iv) Gardens:        
21                                        3                                               18 
   
Total No.       Interviewed.        Cultivators.                   Absentees. 
21                     17                         18                                     4 
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(v) Livestock:        Cattle.            Sheep.               Goats.                Pigs.         Fowls.              
       (Total No)         
  
        (Families-18)   
44                44                        8                        17          100-105 
                                                      
5                   4                         1                         9                    14                          
4.2. A Summary and Analysis of Results 
 4.2.1. Access to land and the nature of tenure 
The first issue in this sub-section was the question of access to an ‘intsimi’: that is, 
how did people acquire such allotments and have managed to keep them in their 
names to this day. There are four ways by which people can enjoy access to an 
arable allotment in Mission location. The first one is by inheritance, meaning that 
people acquire land that already belongs to their respective families. This is as far as 
the registered holders are concerned; that is, those who were given land by the Cape 
Administration and were therefore registered with that authority. This brings us to 
the question of the nature of tenure and, as it transpired from the interviews, these 
‘amasimi’ were allocated early in the twentieth century by the then Cape 
administration to the parents, and in some cases to grandparents of the people who 
are presently claiming their possession. Except where the interviewees were too 
young to know, or just unsure about the nature of such tenure, most indicated that 
these amasimi have old title deeds (Ezihamba namanxiwa zokhokho- meaning that 
the allotments were allocated with residential sites for the elders), and the holders 
used to pay an annual tax for such allotments. Indeed, the association of these 
‘amasimi’ with the old generation is evidence which possibly links these allotments 
to the 260 ones which were allocated between 1908-20 on the basis of quitrent 
tenure. In terms of such allocations, holders were required to be taxpayers before 
allocations could be effected and, in addition to this, they were required to make 
annual quitrent payments for such allotments, failing which they were given three 
months after which they could have their movable property confiscated or, worst of 
all, their allotments forfeited (CMT/ 57/58 Vol.12, 1912). According to Haines and 
Cross in Cross et al (1988: 74), quitrent tenure dates back to 1849 in the Cape 
Province, of which Transkei was part. Such tenure gave the registered holder 
permanent possession of the land in return for a yearly payment of a nominal rent 
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which was previously fixed at one rands per arable allotment (De Wet, 1987: 463). 
Today, no payment is made at all, and the entire system has broken down. Today 
the headmen, who were previously responsible for these payments, only act in the 
allocation of land; they no longer have to chase people who do not pay taxes 
because, in the first place there are no longer any tax dues.  
 
Secondly, people could acquire arable land through sub-division of the same 
allotment into a number of portions for various members of the same family. This 
appears to have been the case with one respondent who reported that the field he 
cultivated belonged to his father (the respondent was born in 1914) and, like the rest 
of his four brothers, was given a portion to cultivate for his family’s subsistence. 
Such sub-division however was not officially allowed (De Wet, 1987: 462), but as 
Cross in De Klerk (1991: 82) asserts, it did take place [unofficially] on a temporary 
basis. To this end, it is believed here that the case of the individual who cultivated 
part of a sub-divided allotment must have been one of those taking place 
unofficially. But what is so crucial about it is that it shows how land shortages have 
plunged the area into such desperation that some families were even resorting to 
unofficial sub-division of allotments in order to maximize the number of members 
who could make a living from agriculture. 
 
 The third way by which arable land could be accessed in Mission location is 
by leasehold. This was confirmed by one of three regular cultivators in the area 
who, despite having no arable land to his name nor that of his family, has managed 
to cultivate up to three morgen at some stage by renting the land from the people 
who have it (that is, making a payment to the a registered holder who is not making 
use of an allotment) mainly in two ways. Firstly, he accessed land in exchange for 
tilling a garden lot of the holder of such an allotment for free once every year with 
his own tractor. Here a very interesting arrangement is entered into between a 
landholder who has no means to cultivate their land but would like to cultivate at 
least a portion as small as a garden, and a landless individual who has the means 
and willingness to put as much land as possible under a plough. Moreover, this does 
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not only call into question the rigidity of tenure which allows people to hold on to 
allotments despite having no means to make use of them, but also shows that some 
individuals are willing to go beyond such rigid bounds of tenure by entering into 
mutually beneficial arrangements. The second way this respondent gets access to 
land is by making the annual quitrent payments (when these were still required) for 
such allotments. Possibly, the purpose of this latter arrangement was to avoid what 
Cross in De Klerk (1991: 82) calls failure to occupy the land beneficially as well as 
failure to pay annual quitrent as according as in terms of the 1936 Land Act and, in 
a way allows the individual to retain possession despite the inability to put the land 
to good use. 
 
 The last way of getting access to an arable allotment in this area is by simply 
negotiating with the holders who are not making use of the land in exchange for 
practically nothing. One respondent from the category of the three regular 
cultivators reported having entered into such an arrangement since he has no land 
of his own. The argument he put forward was centered on his interest and ability to 
make use of the land on the one hand, and what he called the availability of land 
(which lie unused) on the other. However, it must be mentioned that though he does 
not have to give any immediate payment to the holders per se, he still bears the 
burden of having to maintain such things as fencing at his own expense. This 
particular case shows that some holders understand and accept that land must be 
cultivated if it is available, and that this must not be prevented by the fact that the 
registered holder does not have the means to do so. But, though cheap, this kind of 
arrangement was the most fraught with problems from the experience of the 
individual who is borrowing the land. To illustrate this, it is much easier for the 
party who gives their land to the borrower to take this land away from the borrower 
regardless of the motive for doing so as the borrowing respondent reported. 
Moreover, he believes though the registered holder want their land back, he is not 
too sure whether they are going to put it into agricultural use or it is just because 
they are jealous of his progress on the land itself.  
 
 49 
 The next item in this subsection is that of the individual or party entitled to 
inheritance of an arable allotment. All the respondents interviewed agreed that, 
their eldest sons would inherit the allotments they hold, just as it was the case with 
them, and in some cases their late husbands, when they acquired the same 
allotments. According to Cross in De Klerk (1991: 82) this has been the 
administration policy, and it stated that holdings must pass without subdivision to a 
single male heir. As far as this policy is concerned, only the eldest son is entitled to 
an agricultural livelihood, and in the case of a family with more than one son- and in 
the face of land shortages in Mission location- it is clear that the rest of those sons 
have no stake in agriculture as a source of their livelihood. They surely must seek 
other sources. Some of these ‘amasimi’ in Mission location are currently held by 
widows, and in this connection De Wet (1987: 462) seems to be right when he asserts 
that “on the death of a landowner, his widow is entitled ‘to occupy [and make use 
of] the land after her husband’s death, without actually taking transfer, and that 
only after the death of a widow can the male heir take transfer’”. This however is 
the case in Mission location with at least seven of the 14 registered holders actually 
interviewed. But all in all, a registered holder of an arable allotment has to be a 
male heir, as all the respondents broadly confirmed. 
 
 In terms of the actual size of the arable allotments, however, of the fifteen 
people interviewed and who hold the land in their families’ names, fourteen did not 
know the actual size. This is understandable especially in view of the fact that the 
actual allocations were made to their parents and that in most cases the present 
holders exhibit evidence of a long detachment from such lands and their cultivation. 
Most of these people were not even sure of having seen the actual quitrent titles to 
the land with their own eyes, again showing that these people are less concerned 
with both the holding and use of the land. The one respondent who knew that they 
have four morgen (3, 43 ha) was one of the few who have cultivated at least once in 
the last seven years (i.e. since 1996). According to the Report of the planning 
Committee that surveyed Mission location for the purposes of rehabilitation in 1945, 
the size of all arable allotments in the area was set at an average of 3. 24 hectares, 
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having been reduced from its 4. 05 hectare size (TPC 2/36/5/25, 1946: 30).  This 
however concurs with De Wet’ s (1987: 462-3) estimation of 3. 43 hectares as the 
standard size of most quitrent allotments.  
 
 Moreover, in terms of the fertility of the land, most of the respondents 
reported the land to have been good in fertility as far as they can remember (most of 
which have done very little or no cultivation themselves). But there were two 
respondents who correctly stated that land cannot be fertile by itself, but can be 
made to be so by the person who works it. By this it was meant that the more 
fertilizers were applied to the land, the more it was likely to be fertile, and vice 
versa. (the question of the use of fertilizers in the area is tackled below.) 
 
 All the respondents who are registered holders of the land reported the land 
to be still in the name of their respective families, that is, it has not been transferred, 
sold or forfeited to another family. Of these, three reported their hope of making use 
of their allotments as soon as they can afford to do so. These three are among those 
people for whom the problem is the lack of fencing material, and they still strongly 
believe that they will be able to overcome this and get back to the land. 
 
 4.2.2. Extent of Cultivation 
(a) Cultivation of Amasimi 
Broadly speaking, every interviewee cultivated maize, beans, melons and pumpkins, 
and one individual indicated that they reserved a portion for potatoes most of which 
they sold around the location. (This notion of selling only apply to families who have 
cultivated at least in the past seven years when the rest of the others were no longer 
cultivating, and therefore in a position to purchase agricultural products.) As 
McAllister (2001: 45) observed of Shixini location in Willowvale, Transkei, in 
Mission location one crop of maize, which is the staple, is produced annually during 
summer. This crop is planted shortly after the falling of the first summer rains, 
because in any case cultivation in these areas is dry land cultivation, and depends on 
the right quantity of rain falling at the right time every year (Leeuwenburg, 1977: 
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7). Other crops- that is beans, melons and pumpkins- are planted after the maize 
has germinated mainly between the maize plants. 
 
 How then do the people cultivate (or used to cultivate in the case of those who 
have not cultivated for a number of years, if not decades)? To answer this question, 
focus was made on the issue of labour, traction (technology), seed and fertilizer. To 
start with the question of labour, it transpired from the interviews that there are 
three ways by which labour was, and is, acquired in Mission location and, as it will 
be noted here, the difference between these ways tells of a change in agricultural 
practices over time- i.e. between those who cultivated in the past and are no longer 
doing so at present and those who are currently cultivating. The first way of 
acquiring labour was by means of family members (and in some cases extended 
family members). The fact that family members were available for agricultural 
work reveals the significance that was then attached to agriculture as part of a 
family’s means of subsistence. Secondly, in addition to family members, the services 
of (poor) landless families could be acquired in exchange for a payment in kind 
(usually from the harvest they have helped cultivating). Thirdly, and as for the 
people who are currently cultivating or have cultivated at least in the last seven 
years, hiring labour for a cash wage is commonplace today, and five households 
reported their use of this form of acquiring labour (two of which have not cultivated 
for at least the past seven years). Labour can be hired at twenty five rands a person 
a day. This however shows the importance of cash today as people are so desperate 
for it that they do not even hesitate to take such low paying jobs as hoeing. 
Moreover, it is characteristic of agricultural practices today as in the past it was not 
at all a common thing. furthermore, it shows how such factors as education have 
impacted on the family structure as children, who used to be instrumental in land 
cultivation are not only unavailable during their school term, but also unlikely to 
play a role in future as they prefer wage labour on leaving school. 
 
 As far as traction is concerned, the responses of the people were again by and 
large shaped by changes over time. To illustrate this, all the respondents who have 
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not cultivated their amasimi for at least the past ten to fifteen years indicated that 
the technology which had been mostly used in land cultivation was that of ox-drawn 
ploughs; in effect indicating both the importance and abundance of livestock in the 
past. All of them reported that such oxen belonged to their respective family 
homesteads. This finding coincided with Westcott’s in Wilson et al (1977: 141) 
finding that oxen were required for the traditional ‘ideal’ pattern of cultivation as 
well as Leeuwenburg’s (1977: 7) assertion that ‘in the Transkei, the land surface is 
ploughed by ox-drawn ploughs for the most part’. For those who have cultivated at 
least in the last seven years, however, the picture is different. Though two of these 
(out of five) are currently not engaged in any cultivation, they all indicated 
increased importance of a tractor, and four of these used both a tractor and 
livestock, while two used a tractor only. Of these, four employed the services of their 
own tractors, while the other two hired a tractor at R 150 a contour (which is 
roughly about the size of a garden) for up to three contours. These responses, 
however, in addition to telling of a change in time, also show that for one to engage 
in land cultivation at present, cash is the basic requirement and that, the more one 
has cash, the more they are likely to put land under the plough- than was the case in 
the past.  
 
 The importance of cash in land cultivation was further demonstrated in the 
question of the seed in the cultivation of amasimi. The three individuals currently 
engaged in the cultivation of amasimi all confirm that they buy both their seed and 
fertilizer- basically buying what they call ‘dipped seed’ (imbewu editshiweyo) and 
commercial fertilizer (igwane) at their own expense. This is in contrast to the rest of 
the respondents who reported that in the past i.e. when their parents and 
grandparents were engaged in land cultivation, both the seed and fertilizer were not 
bought. For the seed they used what was called ‘isiswenye’, which is basically a 
selection made from the healthiest- looking portions of a particular maize harvest 
which are then preserved for use as seed in the next season- basically the cream of 
the crop. To use McAllister’s (2001: 61) description, ‘isiswenye’ is the quantity of 
the very best quality cobs [in a particular harvest] from which the next season’s seed 
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is taken. As for fertilizer, all of them reported that kraal manure, which was 
collected from the homestead cattle kraals, was used as fertilizer. Contrary to the 
situation at the present time, this reference to the use of kraal manure points to the 
importance of cattle in the type of agriculture that was practiced in the past; in 
addition to their role as draught animals, cattle provided kraal manure that was 
used as fertilizer. 
  
For the three regular cultivators, a further question was asked about 
whether they have registered an increase or decrease in yield in the last season. One 
reported that his total yield has decreased as a result of his cutting down in the 
extent of land he cultivated (from up to ten morgen to only three at present) due to 
his inability to afford repairing fences in all allotments. The second one, however, 
believes he almost registered a decrease despite having increased the extent of land 
under cultivation. The reason he cited for this was that there were heavy rains, 
which in the end drowned some of his crops. In this regard Leeuwenburg (1977: 7) 
makes a very crucial point about the dramatic effects of climatic conditions 
(droughts, heavy rains and wrongly timed rains) on the harvest. This respondent 
reported that if it was not for his innovation to  have some crops grown early in the 
season (which became good) and some later (which became bad), he could have 
registered a dismal decrease. This innovation is similar to that described by 
McAllister (2001) in his account of Shixini people of the Willowvale district. 
According to McAllister, in Shixini some households prefer cultivating their 
allotments at two or three different times in a particular season. This does not only 
guarantee them a continuous supply of green maize throughout the period between 
the ripening and the actual harvest of the product, but also allows them to take 
advantage of unpredictable climatic conditions. The third and last respondent in 
this category was not particularly sure of his harvest since he reported not having 
enough time to take a close look at it because of being busy with wage labour, which 
is his permanent occupation. This does not mean that the other two respondents are 
full-time farmers. Despite not presently being engaged in any wage-paying 
employment (one being a pensioner and the other pursuing a variety of occupations- 
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such as collecting and selling bottles), they nevertheless also cultivate during the 
summer season like any other part-time farming household. The significance of this 
is that even the people who are regularly cultivating do not solely depend on 
agriculture for livelihood; they also engage, or have engaged, in other ways of 
making a living. 
 
 Not a single respondent knew the exact quantity of the produce they have 
yielded in the their fields the last time they have cultivated, and can be attributed to 
the African tradition of consuming a considerable portion of the crops green- i.e. 
straight from the field (Lipton in Wilson et al, 1977; McAallister, 2001). In spite of 
this lack of clarity, however, all the respondents knew exactly what they did, or 
rather was done, with the produce once it has been harvested. For those for whom 
cultivation has not been an occupation at least for the past ten or so years, the yield 
was consumed at home (it was mainly for subsistence). The two most notable 
reasons for this were that: (i) since families were big in the past (extended families), 
the harvest went a long way towards their subsistence; (ii) and since most of the 
people were engaged in agriculture, practically no one was keen to purchase maize 
and the like crops. Those who have cultivated at least as late as 1996 reported 
having sold a portion of their produce for cash, but this only took place when the 
harvest was good and abundant, sometimes with great returns e. g. one family sold 3 
000 rands worth of their produce and managed to purchase a beast which they used 
for a traditional ceremony. For the three regular cultivators, however, selling a 
small portion of the produce does take place on a regular basis. One of these three 
puts a stall for green maize and beans in the streets of the town of Butterworth and 
sells to anyone there who is keen on buying. For the other two, selling takes place in 
the homestead, with willing buyers coming there for purchasing. The fact that only 
these three individuals engage in these activities makes agriculture in the area not a 
widespread activity. These three furthermore indicated a willingness to increase 
their yields in the future but only when given the necessary financial assistance and 
would then engage in some sort of full-time farming. But all in all the broad 
similarity across all the respondents is that in the practice of agriculture there was, 
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and still is, that basic need to subsist. Even where selling does take place, only a 
portion of the produce is taken to the market, with the rest being left at home for 
both the humans and livestock of the family to subsist. 
 
 On the question of the last time they have cultivated their ‘amasimi’ (a 
question which was directed to those who no longer cultivate), only four of the 
fourteen respondents knew the date exactly. For one it was in the 1980’s; two in 
1996; and the last one said it was in 1999. For the rest (that is ten of them) it has 
been such a long time that they do not exactly remember the year and, though they 
are all fit to have been cultivating, six of them have not actually cultivated 
themselves.  
 
Regardless, all the respondents were clear about the reasons for not 
cultivating, and these can be summarized as follows: firstly, death of the parents 
who actually did the cultivation and the laziness of the next generation to resume 
such tasks. In this connection it was pointed out that when the parents who actually 
did the cultivation grew old and sick, with the fields being far away as a result of 
residential relocation that came with the Rehabilitation scheme, they stopped 
cultivating. Hence bushes and trees grew out of the fields and the generation that 
was supposed to take over got lazy to clear these. In this chapter it is asserted that 
possibly there was no one around to neither continue with cultivation nor clear the 
bushes that eventually grew out of these fields. Moreover, this was confirmed by one 
respondent who pointed out that the reason he has not cultivated was because of 
spending time away as a migrant labour. 
 
The second reason is the perishing of fencing which was erected in terms of 
government’s conservation schemes (locally referred to as belonging to ‘itrasti’-
SANT) and the inability of the people to revive it. It was pointed out that the people 
are not in a position to afford fencing that is now costly, and that it has been 
government authorities that have always taken the responsibility. Interestingly, one 
respondent did point out that people strongly objected to fencing on the grounds 
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that their children were going to be lazy of attending to livestock since they were to 
become school goers, a thing he claims has indeed been the case. 
 
The third reason is that of the decline of livestock (from dying, it was 
claimed) and the inability to afford a tractor. The decline of livestock is further 
evident in the small number of families that own it now: only five out of the 21 
households who are the subjects of this study. Fourthly it was the location of fields 
far from residential areas as a result of Betterment planning. Though the 
consequences of not cultivating over time are similar to the reason raised in (i) 
above (that is, growth of trees and bushes out of the fields), in this particular case 
residential relocation resulted to demoralization due to the people’s long traveling 
distances to their fields and because they could not look after their crops and this 
increased the incidence of theft.  
 
Interestingly, all these reasons can be linked to the introduction of 
conservation schemes that were, as the authorities claimed, intended to improve 
agriculture. Whether they had been unforeseen on the part of such authorities, their 
consequences have been so devastating for agriculture that they meant its decline as 
a means of subsistence; in a way this supports the argument that the consequence, if 
not the intention behind, these schemes has been to push increasingly more people 
out of agriculture as a source of livelihood. 
 
The fifth reason has more to do with the cash requirements of agriculture 
nowadays. The reason is unemployment and subsequent lack of income. In fact 
from the second reason for not cultivating to this last one, the importance of cash in 
agriculture can be seen. What these last three reasons serve to highlight is the 
limitedness, and even complete absence, of cash income-generating activities of 
some, if not most, of the families included in this study, a point which brings into 
question the viability of both past and present cash-based sources of livelihood on 
which the people of the area have had to depend.   
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 From these reasons above it is possible to come to the following conclusions. 
Firstly, land cultivation in the area has been the main occupation of the original 
registered holders of land who had access to both land and livestock, but not that of 
their descendants. Hence it can be observed that when they died their land was left 
fallow and their livestock died possible as a result of their children not being around 
to attend to it as the parents did. In this chapter it is argued that, given the land 
shortages referred to in the previous chapter (chapter three), most of the generation 
that came after this land-owning class must have engaged in sources of livelihood 
other than agriculture, and in this way were far removed from agriculture which 
was a major means of living for their parents. Surely, if some allotments have not 
been cultivated up to the point of growing into tree forests, quite a long time has 
been spent not engaging in agriculture for a living. Given that the people needed a 
source of living in any case, they must have made use of sources of living other than 
agriculture.  
 
 Secondly, as the traditional means of engaging in agriculture were in a state 
of decline (for example the decline in: the use of livestock, family labour, cultivation 
of amasimi without fences -which changed as a result of the insistence of Betterment 
planners, use of locally grown seed and fertilizer), the more cash-based version that 
was a replacement further made necessary the need for a source of cash. In this way 
people must have possibly found themselves at the crossroads because, as they had 
to engage in means of livelihood other than agriculture (and possibly more cash-
based), they also faced the need to raise more cash for the sake of engaging in 
agriculture. Given the limitedness, and in some cases the virtual absence of 
sufficient income generating activities already discussed above, it is clear that the 
ability of the people to invest cash in agriculture has been seriously limited. 
 
 The need for cash in agriculture was further aggravated by the government’s 
introduction of the so-called conservation schemes that brought about such modern 
agricultural practices as fencing, thereby relieving herd boys who in turn took to 
attending school. As fencing perished beyond the ability of the people to afford 
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reviving it, and because the government hardly took the responsibility, no one could 
attend to livestock but the people who could be hired at a wage to do so, a practice 
that costs more than most families can afford. To this end, it can be argued that 
African agriculture has suffered in the face of changes often brought about by 
changing land allocation and use practices that saw people being driven out of 
agriculture (which was now more cash demanding) in order to afford a living 
particularly in the hands of various government regimes. Even such factors as 
laziness of the people can be accounted for as a result of the widening distance 
between the people and the land (and its productive capacity) brought about by 
such land allocation and use practices. 
 
(b) Cultivation of igadi  
Of the twenty-one homesteads visited- seventeen of which were interviewed and four 
were headed by absentee landlords- there is regular cultivation of ‘iigadi’ in 
eighteen homesteads, including two from the absentee landlord category. In one 
absentee landlord homestead someone is specifically employed to look after the 
homestead and to cultivate the garden at the cost of the family, while in the other 
homestead the wife and the children do the cultivation while the husband (who 
knows about the family’s agricultural history) is away as a wage labourer. For 
clarity, a garden in the African context is the small tract of land immediately 
adjacent to the homestead (May, 1987: 131). The one exception was one of the 
respondents in the category of regular cultivators. He has opted for a conversion of 
his garden lot into an area for keeping his livestock and is cultivating in the ‘intsimi’ 
only.  
 
 Basically all eighteen households cultivate the same crops in their gardens as 
they did, and some still do, in their ‘amasimi’. But in addition to these crops, six 
indicated regular cultivation of potatoes and a further ten that of vegetables such as 
cabbage (which is by and large the most commonly grown), spinach, carrots and 
onions. Fourteen indicated that they strictly use family labour for cultivation of 
igadi, while four reported hiring wage labour (for twenty five rands a day as is the 
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case in the amasimi) in addition to the limited family labour. All gardens are 
ploughed by means of a tractor, hired mainly from the four people in their 
ownership referred to early in this chapter and payable at R 150 a garden. Only 
four people reported buying their seed regularly, and the rest use ‘isiswenye’. As for 
the fertilizer, only one person reported using commercial fertilizer, while another 
six who made the effort to fertilize use kraal manure, which they obtain from their 
own homesteads or that of their neighbours. 
 
 Generally the respondents reported the harvest from their gardens to be very 
small (about two and a half bags on average), and that it is mainly used for 
subsistence. The exception was two people who reported selling potatoes when a 
surplus is registered and maize (from one out of three gardens) respectively. Though 
there is interest in selling, the primary purpose of cultivating a garden from the 
responses above is to subsist. Even though all the respondents reported that the 
garden has always been cultivated simultaneously with the field, intense cultivation 
of them so regularly is taken here as an attempt to try and compensate for the 
inability to cultivate a field- basically cultivating the smallest portion affordable so 
as to have even the most minimal part of subsistence from agriculture.  
  
4.2.3. Livestock ownership 
Concerning livestock, out of eighteen households, five own 44 cattle between them, 
the most of which are owned by the three regular cultivators (9, 14 & 9) 
respectively. The smallness of this total number of families, however, coincides with 
the finding that indeed cattle have dwindled in the area. It is also an interesting 
revelation to find that the people who have both the means and interest to cultivate 
the land regularly own the largest number of cattle. There are 44 sheep in the area 
owned by 4 families, two of which again are among the three regular cultivators 
who again claim the largest number of the flocks (12 and 14 respectively). Only one 
household keep goats, of which there are eight. Pigs are the second evenly 
distributed stock, and the 17 of them in this locality are owned by 9 households; five 
are owned by one of the regular cultivators, and the second largest number owned 
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by a single family is 3. Lastly, since, some households were not exactly sure of the 
number of fowls they own, the estimate can be put at 100-105 fowls owned between 
14 households, the maximum owned in a single homestead being 19.  
 
 Cattle and pigs are the most readily sold stock (by the few people who own 
them) from which some profit can be made. Cattle are bought by people for (i) 
ceremonial reasons; that is, when a traditional ceremony has to be performed in 
connection with for example ancestral ceremonies, a funeral, initiation or even to 
graduate as a traditional healer. They can be sold around the location or people can 
come as far as a neighbouring district to purchase a beast (and a good beast can be 
sold for no less than R 3, 000). As for pigs, the common practice is to slaughter it 
and sell in small portions and, usually the market is provided by people who receive 
government grants (old age, disability etc) and selling takes place where the pay 
points are located; for example in the local trading store in the case of Mission 
location. They are followed by goats of which there is a high demand in traditional 
ceremonies- this is also the case with cattle though to a lesser extent. Sheep are 
slaughtered occasionally for domestic consumption, the same as fowls- despite one 
respondent who reported selling a fowl occasionally when in need of groceries. Pigs 
and fowls are the most demanding in terms of maintenance as they solely depend on 
maize and other cash products. They are followed by cattle, which demand 
immunization though they mainly eat grass from the veld. 
 
 That the three regular land cultivators own the most livestock in the locality 
can be explained in a number of ways. Basically there is more cash flowing into 
these families particularly from agricultural activities. They all have a tractor each 
whose services are demanded by the majority of the homesteads in the entire 
location (which can amount to more than 400 homesteads) and from which 
enormous cash returns are made. From this cash they can manage to acquire more 
livestock, which they can maintain at all costs and from which they can make 
profitable sales. With cash always available there is always the means to cultivate 
the land more than the rest of the families in the locality can manage, and the 
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possibility of making more profit from the yield made from such cultivation. In this 
way a perpetual cycle is established by which cash from agricultural activities is 
ploughed back into agriculture in an even more profitable manner, thus the three 
possibly manage to be at the top of agricultural activities in the area. 
 
4.3. Conclusion                                
The decline of agriculture in Mission location as shown in this chapter reveals a 
number of factors important in the practice of agriculture today, as opposed to the 
situation in the past. First it shows that access to arable land does not however 
amount to maximum use of such land. This was proved by showing that, of the 
nineteen registered holders of arable allotments in the area, only one still makes 
regular use of such an allotment. What is important today is cash in the practice of 
agriculture, as proved by the three regular cultivators who each collect cash from 
both the services of their personal tractors in the entire area and sale of livestock 
and agricultural products- not to mention the fact that they have first indulged, or 
are still indulging, in some form of wage labour. This is different from the old 
practice of using ox-drawn ploughs and home grown seeds by the elders who had 
access to both land and livestock, which was not the case with their descendants who 
had to engage in cash-based livelihood sources that only went as far as their 
families’ subsistence needs- in a way effectively denying them an opportunity to save 
enough cash so as to be able to make a comeback to agriculture. Consequently they 
make regular use of their iigadi which, though considerably smaller that amasimi, 
are a vital compensation to the inability to plough such amasimi. Cash is further 
obtainable from the sale of livestock, whose ownership in the area is by and large a 
privilege of the three regular cultivators, and thus their domination of the spectrum 
of agricultural activity is further entrenched. Perhaps the most unfortunate part of 
this account of the decline of agriculture in the area is that, in some way the 
Rehabilitation scheme, introduced to the area as an attempt to improve agriculture, 
can in some crucial ways be held responsible for such a state of decline.  
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Chapter Five 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
5.1. From the Rehabilitation Scheme to a decline in Agriculture 
                 “The Story of Mission Location in Butterworth, Transkei” 
 
  5.1.1.  Conservation Planning and the Reserve Policies in South Africa 
In the social history of South Africa, there has been an unprecedented 
transformation of the rural African population from self-sufficient peasants to wage 
labourers. To effect this transformation, the role of agriculture in providing a living 
was undermined and in turn it was replaced by a dependence for livelihood on wage 
labour in white industrial and farming areas. To further this, successive white 
regimes embarked on a process of land dispossessions of the African majorities, 
confinement of Africans to strictly demarcated and limited areas called the ‘reserves 
that, due to the smallness of their size, subsequently deteriorated into overcrowded, 
overstocked and consequently eroded lands primarily serving the purpose of 
providing labour to the white areas. In addition, access to some land in the reserves 
was instrumental in the entire process since it served as a home to the families of the 
migrant labourers on the one hand, as well as a means of subsidizing the low wages 
paid to migrants with its rudimentary agriculture on the other. 
 
 Given the smallness of the land demarcated as the reserves, however, the 
pressure of the population on it became evident in the form of massive soil erosion. 
This was observed particularly by the NEC of 1932 that did not hesitate to urge 
hastened state intervention, in order to halt what it termed ‘the creation of desert 
conditions’. In response, the South African government resolved to establish the 
SANT, which it specifically tasked to remedy the ‘deplorable condition’ of land in 
the reserves. In this regard, soil conservation was advocated first by introducing the 
Betterment scheme under the auspices of the Department of Native Affairs. 
  
According to the SANT officials, Betterment aimed to reverse soil erosion, 
improve agriculture and raise living standards in the reserves by means of a new 
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land-use plan. In terms of this plan, residential, arable and grazing areas would be 
separated by means of fencing. The keeping of too many stock by Africans was seen 
as the prime cause soil erosion, and stock limitation was the inevitable solution. This 
was so regardless of the fact that the problem of the reserves has always been land 
shortage since their creation and that the SANT, which was also empowered to 
acquire land for Africans, did so regrettably slower than was expected especially 
given the land in the reserves. In addition, scores of reserve families (30% in the 
Transkei alone) had no livestock in the 1940’s ( Hendricks, 1990). Determined to go 
ahead, Betterment officials used what was called the Betterment Proclamation of 
1939 specifically designed to combat overstocking. In terms of this proclamation, 
livestock could be culled if the authorities found it in excess of the recommended 
carrying capacity after they have conducted a count in any area declared in terms of 
the scheme. But this had to be done after consulting with the people of that area. 
 
 Consultation with the people was however only in theory, and the general 
practice became a situation whereby the district magistrate (as Native 
Commissioner) declared Betterment areas only in consultation with the headman. 
This always led to objections on the part of the people and it consequently exposed 
the policy differences operating in the different echelons of the government. For 
instance, while the people strongly resisted the issue of stock culling, the DNA 
insisted on securing the approval of the people before commencing with the scheme; 
on the other hand, the secretary general threatened to use compulsion of 
government appointed chiefs. Again, when the TPC influenced the CMT to 
recommend the elimination of compulsory consultation, the central government 
responded by putting aside the entire program of stock limitation (Hendricks, 1990). 
 
 Betterment was delayed over the WW2 years as the government shifted both 
personnel and financial resources to its war effort. Indeed so much for a scheme 
that was instituted as an urgent attempt to arrest soil erosion. Notwithstanding these 
delays, the 1949 Young Commission that enquired into overstocking over the war 
years, recommended the extension of the 1939 Proclamation provisions to cover the 
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entire Transkei, but the UTTGC sternly opposed this. Such a recommendation had 
disregarded the fact that Betterment was being successfully introduced in, or rather 
affecting, very few locations in the entire Transkei (Hendricks, 1990), and that this 
was proving the inability of the government to implement the scheme in most parts 
of the reserves. Moreover, the fact that it was failing to achieve its aims was evident 
in the increased rate of proletatianisation that had so worried state authorities to the 
extent of changing their approach to dealing with the reserve land situation. 
 
 Indeed the number of Africans in urban areas had increased enormously 
especially as a result of being sparked by an economic boom in the country during 
the 1930’s. Such a presence of Africans in the urban areas had socio-economic and 
political implications in that, as urban dwellers, they would soon need social benefits 
such as housing, and the government was not prepared to give way to these since in 
principle they would undermine the migrant labour system. The general consensus 
in government quarters was towards the improvement of the reserve conditions 
with the specific purpose of increasing their carrying capacity. This was outlined in 
the new ‘Rehabilitation scheme’ towards the end of the war (Beinart & Bundy in 
Klein, 1980; Hendricks, 1990). The new scheme, that was to be launched by means 
of Regional Planning Committees that would survey, and draw plans for, the 
reserve areas, introduced veld conservation, improvement of water supplies and 
afforestation among other things to add to residential relocation and stock 
limitation (Statement of Land Policy, 1945). In mid 1945 the TPC was formed as 
testimony to this. 
 
 Outlined more succinctly in what was called ‘A New Era of Reclamation’ by 
Smit in 1945, the new scheme centered on the division of the rural African 
population into two groups, one based on the land and farming on a full-time basis, 
while the other was to be based in rural villages to be established for this purpose 
and would have access to neither land nor livestock. Their livelihood was to depend 
on the development of industries after the war. With this plan the government 
hoped to overcome the problem of urban Africans on the one hand, while the 
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migrant labour system would nevertheless be perpetuated through those Africans in 
rural villages. But unfortunately poor industrial development meant that this plan 
hardly materialized. 
 
 The implementation of the Rehabilitation scheme was fraught with both 
technical and political difficulties, and it was the latter difficulties that saw the 
government shifting its policies to make them more stringent. Technical difficulties 
were caused by shortage of both staff members and equipment to carry out the 
scheme (Hendricks, 1990). Of the political difficulties, however, non surpassed the 
lack of cooperation of the local people, and this soon manifested into widespread 
resistance to the entire scheme. It is this resistance that saw the government shifting 
its policy priorities to the elevation of chiefs and headmen by empowering them with 
powers to inflict criminal sanctions on non- compliers, in a way making them 
entities through which the scheme would be channeled (Hendricks, 1990). This 
particular move was to see widespread and violent resistance to both the schemes 
and these coopted leaders particularly spearheaded by the AAC. Chiefs were not 
only bypassed, they were killed in areas such as Pondoland and such structures as 
fenced grazing areas were simply vandalized, such as was the case in Ndabakazi 
near Butterworth (Tabata, 1950; Beinart & Bundy in Klein, 1980). Though the 
government suppressed these by means of brute force, their occurrence highlighted 
the widespread opposition to the scheme that was seen as both a means to taking 
away the land and an attempt to subject the people to migrant labour. In addition, 
the lenient 1939 Proclamation gave way to a harsher 1949 one that partially eroded 
the consultation clause. As if this was not enough, the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act as 
well as a 1956 Proclamation were both used to fully erode consultation by decreeing 
that to go ahead with the schemes authorities only need to explain to the tribal 
authorities, and not the people (Hendricks, 1990). 
 
 The prospects of any viable agriculture in the reserves were doomed when 
the NP Government rejected the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission. 
The Tomlinson Commission of 1950 was tasked with enquiring into a 
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comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the reserves [and the covet purpose 
this was going to serve for the government was that of dealing with unwanted 
African presence in white areas]. In its 1954 report, the commission reaffirmed the 
division of the rural population into progressive farmers and wage labourers. It also 
recommended freehold tenure in African areas.  
 
 This policy decision (of rejecting the Tomlinson commission 
recommendations) has however raised questions as to the real intentions of the NP 
government. To this end, the argument that, since the reserves have always been 
viewed as providers of cheap labour on the one hand, as well as home for those not 
needed in those places of work on the other, bringing about full-time farming in 
these areas would have undermined this historic role seems plausible. Also as homes 
for Africans not needed in the white areas either for political (such as those in urban 
and black spot areas) or economic (such as redundant farm labourers) reasons, the 
removal of up to 50% of the population was impossible in the face of mechanizing 
and consolidating white farms, the need to get rid of black spots, and the systematic 
removal of Africans from the urban areas. This was confirmed through the policy of 
forced removals of millions of Africans from the above-mentioned three areas to the 
reserves that the government embarked on between the 1960’s and 1980’s. The 
government in addition introduced the Self Governing states in these areas to make 
the problem of control of Africans in these conditions a burden of African 
governments themselves. With this move the migrant labour system was fully 
regimented.  
 
 Having discussed the conservation policies of the South African government 
as part of an overall reserve policy that primarily aimed at regimenting the migrant 
labour system by limiting the amount of productive land available to Africans, this 
chapter will now turn to a specific case of an area in Butterworth, Transkei, called 
Mission location. The purpose of this is to show how the schemes worked in 
practice.  
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 5.1.2. Mission Location and the Rehabilitation Scheme 
In Mission location the Rehabilitation scheme was introduced by Mr. Wakeford, the 
resident magistrate, in 1944 and the survey of the area by the TPC was carried out 
between July and December 1945. In its January 1946 report, the TPC found that 
there were 424 dwelling sites in the area, some of which were occupied under 
quitrent tenure while others were occupied under certificate of occupation. These 
were finally issued in 1920. In the Committee’s view, these sites were so large and 
scattered that it recommended their concentration and reduction. When the survey 
was done in 1945, there were 616 families of both Gcaleka and Mfengu origins in the 
area, and though the latter group was closer to the Wesleyan missionaries in the 
area, all Africans were under the headmanship of Mr. Monakali appointed by the 
government (TPC 2/36/5/25, 1946). 
 
 Though the committee found that most of the land in the area was badly 
eroded as a result of excessive cultivation and steepness of slope and recommended 
its forfeiture, the distribution of arable land in terms of the 1920 arrangements was 
so skewed that only 260 of the 616 families accessed it. In terms of use, land was 
available for (i) dwelling sites issued in a disorganized manner as stated above; (ii) 
arable lands issued regardless of slope suitability such that they had to be eliminated 
from cultivation according to the recommendation of the committee; (iii) and an 
overgrazed veld that served as a grazing area. In its future system that was to 
reverse what it termed an ‘unbalanced diet’, the committee recommended more 
vegetable growing, livestock improvement, as well as physical reclamation works 
such as diversion banks and grass leys. In a bid to have this system of farming 
enforced on the people, the committee recommended more cooperation of the people 
that was to be sought through strict state sanctions. The central government 
approved this plan in January 1947 and the rehabilitation works were commenced 
in July of that year (TPC 2/36/5/25, 1946). 
 
 The recommendations of the TPC somehow had some negative implications 
for agriculture in Mission location that this chapter will now turn to; in fact, 
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judging by the outcomes that will become apparent in the course of the chapter, the 
scheme had more negative than positive aspects for agriculture in the area. First of 
all, the recommendation was that excessively cultivated, and therefore badly eroded 
land must not be cultivated, and the result was the denial of access to land for those 
with eroded lands. Furthermore, those denied access to land were in effect pushed 
out of agriculture as a source of livelihood and, in line with Smit’s recommendation 
that they could not live by agriculture, were therefore to look to sources of 
livelihood other than agriculture. Worse of all was the fact that the scheme 
recommended the reduction in the number of families with arable land in an area 
where access to arable land was already a privilege of only 260 out of 616 families 
(43%); that is, in area where landlessness was already acute. The practice, however, 
amounted to nothing more than making increasingly many families cease looking to 
agriculture for a living. 
 
 In all probability acute land shortages were a corollary to population 
increases in an area with no land for expansion. This however has for long been a 
state of affairs in South Africa deliberately brought about by white regimes with the 
purpose of preventing the development of full-time farming in the African areas (the 
reserves). It was accomplished by nothing other than land conquests and 
dispossessions, the land Acts of 1913 and 1936 as well as the conservation schemes 
themselves. In this way the Rehabilitation scheme, as well as its inability to improve 
agriculture in the reserves, must be looked at in the context of continued denial of 
land to the ever- growing African populations. 
 
 With some arable land in the area having been allocated on unsuitable and 
erosion- prone slopes, the committee went ahead to recommend the elimination of 
53 whole lands and 60 portions of others from arable agriculture. This however 
resulted to a dramatic increase in the number of families with no arable land from 
356 to 409, and in addition to this 60 more families found their allotments being 
reduced. Despite attempts to acquire new plots, 14 more people were nevertheless to 
be left landless as a result of the scheme (TPC 2/36/5/25, 1945). If this was guided by 
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Smit’s optimism that industrial development will absorb this class of landless 
people, the bleakness of opportunities in the country’s industrial sector as a whole 
made this almost impossible (Board, 1964). The committee itself acknowledged this 
in its report, but nevertheless proceeded with land dispossessions. This however 
shows just how the scheme guaranteed the labour supply to the white areas by 
making sure that, irrespective of employment opportunities at the time of 
dispossession, those without land were ever going to be unable to live by agriculture, 
and therefore always readily available as wage labourers. 
 
 To further the dispossession of as many families as possible, the 
concentration of kraal sites was inevitably accompanied by their reduction. This 
reduction put the size of kraal sites, which have been much bigger, at 0, 25 hectares. 
The effects of reduction in particular were negative, in that they implied the 
reduction of cultivated gardens integral to these sites. This was a heavy blow 
especially to families who looked to these gardens as their only source of livelihood 
from agriculture. In fact, this was not only peculiar to Mission location, as in the 
rest of the areas where the schemes were implemented it did take place. 
  
For the minority who still had access to arable land, the future system of 
farming they were expected to practice in terms of the scheme nevertheless left them 
at the crossroads as far as improvement of agriculture was concerned. To illustrate 
this, though diversion banks and other physical structures could be created with 
some success, the question of the use of fertilizers and improved stock grades that 
require financial backing was left unanswered. Thus, the improvement of 
agriculture through these means remained a dream for the majority who could 
hardly afford them, and its supplementation with other sources of livelihood could 
hardly be expected to cease by any chance. 
 
 The fact that agriculture was not being able to fully to support the people 
who practiced it in Mission location is evident in the committee’s observation that 
the area experienced an absence of able-bodied men who in turn made difficult the 
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cultivation of the land still available. Those absent were not anywhere else other 
than in the white areas where they worked for wages as the Committee states in its 
findings. 
 
 In spite of the implications discussed above, the government resolved to have 
the scheme implemented in the area forcibly if necessary. This was going to be the 
case if the people failed to cooperate, and it was going to be achieved by means of 
administrative control as well as strict legislative sanction (TPC 2/36/5/25, 1946). In 
this process, the very same policy decision of elevating the headman to a position of 
being able to punish non-compliers was adopted in the area. Thus the headman was 
not only to become a channel for the Rehabilitation scheme, he was also assigned to 
deal with potential resistance to it. 
 
 As the next and final section of this chapter will show, both landlessness and 
the inability of the type of agriculture practiced in the rehabilitated Mission location 
to meet subsistence needs of the people have resulted to a situation by which large 
numbers of families (including the few who still have access to arable land) have 
dismissed the idea of clinging to agriculture for a living. Today, the picture is that of 
a decline in agriculture evident in both arable and livestock farming. To prove that 
the people have not lost interest in agriculture per se, the small garden portions in 
the kraal sites are still cultivated regularly with amazing enthusiasm. Clearly there 
are reasons other than loss of interest for not cultivating ‘amasimi’. 
 
  5.1.3. The Story of a decline in agriculture in Mission Location today 
For a complete illustration of the decline of agriculture in Mission location, this 
section looks at three related issues. These are: (i) access to land and the nature of 
tenure; (ii) the extent of cultivation in both ‘amasimi’ and ‘iigadi’; (iii) and livestock 
ownership. 
 
 First of all, it must be pointed out that there is a striking rate of landlessness 
in the area. To illustrate this, out of a total of 118 households in the entire area, only 
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21 have access to an ‘intsimi’, and of this 21 households, two are unregistered 
holders. This brings us to the question of how arable land is acquired in the area. 
Land can be acquired in four different ways. First of all, land can be acquired 
through inheritance. Given that the allocation of these amasimi dates back to the 
early 20th
 
 century and was effected through the issuing of quitrent title deeds, they 
are held on quitrent tenure. Secondly, land could be sub-divided among various 
members of the same family though unofficially. This has taken place in the area at 
least as far as one family in this study is concerned. 
 The third way by which land is acquired is by means of leasehold. For one 
household this has taken place, and the lessee has paid for land in at least two ways. 
First he cultivates the garden portion of the household that leases their land once 
every year with his own tractor and, secondly he used to make the required annual 
quitrent payments on behalf of the leaser. The fourth way of getting land is by 
simply borrowing it in exchange for practically nothing, despite having to maintain 
fences and other things, as one household head has confirmed in the area. These two 
individuals getting land by leasehold and borrowing, however, are the two 
unregistered holders referred to earlier. In addition, together with only one of the 
registered holders, they are the only three who are currently engaged in land 
cultivation. The case of these two is very important in that it shows that there are 
ways by which current land holding arrangements can be bypassed to put the land 
into productive use. This is an avenue that deserves special exploration in future as 
there might possibly be more individuals like these two in the area. In fact, though 
not falling within the scope of this respective dissertation, one individual, who is not 
from Mission location, has entered into a leasehold arrangement with someone from 
a residential area adjoining the one that is the subject of this study with some 
interesting results. (But unfortunately the details of the payment in exchange for the 
land are not known at this point in time, but this does not mean this case is not 
worth mentioning.) He makes use of the land throughout the year (cultivating maize 
and vegetables) that he sells and he even manages to employ up to more than ten 
individuals from the area every season (up to more than 30 a year). So, leasehold 
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and similar arrangements can be mutually beneficial than simply holding on to land 
without making use of it. 
 
 Fourteen out of the fifteen individuals did not know the size of the land they 
are holding. In fact, most do not even remember seeing the actual titles to the land, 
and this confirms their long detachment from both the holding and cultivation of 
the land in question. Since one individual knows that they have four morgen (3, 43 
ha), and as is common that quitrent allotments were of this size, it is possible that 
these plots are more or less of this extent. Though all the respondents report the 
land to still being n their names, only three were optimistic about making use of it in 
the near future. Needless to say, those who did not report this again give more 
muscle to the argument for the encouragement of leasehold to capable individuals. 
 
 If only 3 out of the 21 arable allotments are regularly cultivated, and if two of 
these are cultivated on the basis of a negotiated settlement by people who have no 
land in their names, then it can be seen how much land is not being put into 
agricultural use. Similarly, the extent to which agriculture has declined in the area 
can be observed. Broadly, people cultivate, or rather cultivated in the case of those 
who no longer do so, maize, beans, melons and pumpkins once every year. The 
interesting question was that of the way people cultivate or cultivated especially 
since it revealed striking differences between past and present agricultural 
practices. Concerning labour, in the past the family was the main source of labour, 
and no payment was made in return for the service. But at present, that is, at least 
as late as 1996, given the schooling of children as well as the absence of some family 
members who work elsewhere, labour is generally hired and paid for in cash. This is 
also necessitated by the fact that nowadays extended families are less abundant than 
smaller nuclear families. So more cash is needed in agriculture today. The need for 
cash in agriculture today was further demonstrated in the question of the traction, 
seed and fertilizer. Contrary to the past during which oxen, home grown seed and 
kraal manure were not only abundant, but also the main means by which 
agriculture was practiced, today the hiring of a tractor (for cash), buying of the seed 
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and commercial fertilizer are not uncommon. Given that the costs of a tractor are 
high (up to 450 rands a field in the past season), it is not surprising that the three 
regular cultivators own their own tractors. 
 
 For the three regular cultivators, the knowledge of whether their yield has 
increased or decreased in the past season depended on the extent of land they have 
had access to, the unpredictable climatic conditions, as well as the amount of time 
they had devoted to looking into it personally. For instance, one reported a decrease 
because he has cut down on the extent of land as a result of his inability to repair 
fences, while the other got a portion of his harvest so badly damaged by heavy rains. 
The third one, who still works as a wage labourer on a full time basis, had not 
devoted enough time to register the exact quantity of his yield. 
 
 The most difficult question to answer was that of the exact amount of yield, 
possibly due to the traditional practice of consuming crops straight from the field 
throughout the period between the ripening and the actual harvesting. But the 
interesting thing was that of what was actually done with such yield, as again it 
showed stark differences between the those who are currently cultivating and those 
who are not. To illustrate this, in the past the largeness of families and the 
involvement of most families throughout the area in agriculture meant that the yield 
found its way into the subsistence needs of the respective families. This contrasts 
with the current practice by the three regular cultivators of selling a portion of their 
produce in the area and even in the town of Butterworth. In spite of this motivation 
to sell, however, a large part of the yield nevertheless goes into subsistence even in 
the families of these three. 
 
Table three: knowledge of the last time of cultivation by registered holders: 
         
Interviewed.                        Those who knew.                         Those who do not.      
 
14                                              4                                                        10 
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Though only 4 of the 14 registered holders interviewed who currently do not 
cultivate knew exactly when last did they do so, they were all (14 of them) very clear 
as to why they are no longer engaging in cultivation. Firstly, it was the death of 
parents who were the original allottees and the failure of their descendants to 
resume cultivation with the result that fields have now developed into tree forests 
and bushy areas that was the reason. The big distance between the fields and 
residential areas brought about by the government conservation schemes 
aggravated this. This distance in some cases resulted to the demoralization of those 
who had to do cultivation as such occurrences as theft were not uncommon in the 
distant fields, which is the second reason for not cultivating. Thirdly, the perishing 
of fences erected in terms of the schemes and the inability of the people, as well as 
the failure of the government, to revive them that caused a failure to cultivate as 
livestock, which used to be attended to by children who are now school goers, could 
not be kept out of the arable lands. Fourthly, the decline in livestock, also evident in 
the smallness of families in its possession today, also contributed. The interesting 
thing is that all these reasons can be directly linked to the conservation schemes 
initially intended to improve agriculture. But as is shown here, the result has been 
the opposite; a decline in agriculture. The fifth and last reason is that of 
unemployment and subsequent lack of income to invest in a cash-demanding 
agriculture. 
 
 Seemingly, agriculture ceased to be a widely practiced activity when those 
who had land and livestock became unable to engage in it (as a result of both old age 
and death), and their descendants, who had preoccupied themselves with other 
means of livelihood, as they could not wait to inherit land from their parents, never 
had this opportunity. Also because agriculture became a very cash-demanding 
undertaking especially with the decline in livestock (which meant hiring tractors), as 
well as the need to fence one’s allotment to name but a few, it became virtually 
impossible for the majority to invest in it given the absence of viable cash-generating 
activities they could engage in. as such, land poverty and changing agricultural 
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practices especially brought about by state authorities can to some extent be held 
responsible for the decline of agriculture in Mission location. 
 
 As far as gardens are concerned, generally there is widespread and regular 
cultivation in the area. Of the 21 homesteads visited, 18 cultivate their gardens 
regularly. The exception was two of the four absentee landlord households and one 
of the three regular cultivators who have converted his garden into a cattle-keeping 
area. Basically the same crops as in the fields are cultivated in the gardens, except 
that there is also some cultivation of vegetables. Only four of the 18 households use 
hired labour, and the rest use family labour. This shows that these gardens are so 
small that most families manage to cultivate them without outside help. All gardens 
are ploughed by means of a tractor, but the seed used the most is that grown from 
home. The harvest is said to be very small and basically going into family 
subsistence. Moreover, the regularity with which these gardens are cultivated 
somehow proves them to be a means of compensating for the inability to cultivate 
the bigger fields. 
 
 As for livestock ownership, two points are worth mentioning from the very 
onset. The first is that both the total number of livestock and that of families owning 
it is so small that it confirms the finding that indeed livestock has dwindled in the 
area. Secondly, given that the largest number of both herds and flocks are owned by 
the three regular cultivators, it can be seen that even this component of agriculture 
has generally declined in the area and is a privilege of mainly these three only. The 
fact that the three regular cultivators own most of the livestock categories often in 
the majority (for example, they own 32 out of 44 cattle, 26 sheep, and no less than 3 
pigs and 15 fowls between them), and their ownership of tractors that are hired by 
many households in the area, put them at the center of agricultural activity in the 
area. Their sale of both livestock and returns from their tractors’ services as well as 
their selling of agricultural products put them in a good position to re-invest cash in, 
and therefore to perpetuate, agriculture. That they have managed to be in this 
position not because of their involvement in agriculture but through accumulation 
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from elsewhere (mainly in wage labour) makes them a special case that deserves 
closer analysis. Surely they have come a long way to being where they are and 
analyzing them can give an idea of one of the ways by which people can get back to 
agriculture in an area where it is accounted for as a case of decline. This sort of 
accumulation is what other households are unable to do, thus they characterize the 
decline in agriculture in the area which has not only formed the subject of this 
subsection only, but is also that of the dissertation as a whole.  
 
 In sum, the story of agriculture in Mission location, characterized by a 
decline, once again shows just how the Rehabilitation scheme in particular, and 
conservation planning in general, became not only dismal failures in the 
improvement of agriculture, but also practices in line with the reserve policies of the 
South African government that primarily seeked to diminish the extent of arable 
land available to the people in such a way that the majority were rendered incapable 
of making a living by agriculture. 
 
 5.2. Concluding discussion 
The case of Mission location as discussed in this dissertation provides a good 
example of the impact of colonial and apartheid regimes that have comprised the 
government of South Africa especially from as late as the end of the 19th century. 
Since around 1894, the year when Transkei, of which Mission location is part, was 
formally annexed into the Cape Province (Saunders et al, 1974), there have been 
quite a number of changes in the area especially in respect of land tenure and 
agriculture. For instance, by 1920, the Cape administration had already penetrated 
Mission location to the extent that, for the first time, regular payment of taxes had 
become a prerequisite for access to land. Every family therefore had to be registered 
as taxpayers. One adverse effect of this was that for some families, as it happened in 
Mission location, access to land became virtually impossible in the absence of cash. 
In fact, this was the time when a large number of families lost access to land in 
Mission location. 
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 To this end, therefore, it is fair to argue that there was a correlation between 
the introduction of these new tenurial arrangements and the insatiable need for 
labour in the white economy, especially with the discovery of minerals that took 
place around the same period. In fact, this was the only way Africans, who were 
seen as the potential providers of labour, could be forced into wage labour. The 
policy itself was a double-edged sword in that it made possible the acquisition of 
services of both landed and landless Africans since a cash wage became a 
prerequisite for both those with access to land (in their payment of taxes) as well as 
those with no land since this was the only way they could subsist. In mission 
location, about 57% of families fell into the landless category. Furthermore, the 
labour needs of the white economy give an answer to the decision that was taken by 
the Cape administration to make Transkei a ‘reserve’ and to prohibit white land 
seizure in the area (Saunders, 1974). Transkei was to become a labour reserve; that 
is, a place where labour would be reproduced and could be accessed as per needs of 
that economy. This is the basis of the migrant labour system that was favoured in 
South Africa. For this to become possible, both the extent of land to be accessed by 
the few who were lucky enough as well as the size of the entire reserve areas were 
strictly limited. 
 
 But the very basis of this policy- that is, that Africans were seen as providers 
of labour for whites- was fundamentally flawed. Population increase, among other 
things, saw to it that more and more families were becoming landless, and this 
undermined the very basis of the migrant labour system. Thus we see the 
government introducing soil conservation in the late 1930’s. More specifically, it was 
such policies as the Rehabilitation scheme of 1945 that had the most impact in 
Mission location. The scheme was designed to reverse the accelerated migration, 
and potential permanence of, Africans in towns by means of land-use plans 
specifically designed for the reserves with a view to maintaining the migrant labour 
system. Thus in Mission location, as in other areas where the scheme was 
introduced, the scheme was deliberately designed to exclude some, but not other, 
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families in terms of land access. In Mission location this ultimately affected about 53 
families, and as such increased the number of landless families from 356 to 409 (out 
of a total of 616 families). This policy in all probability guaranteed the labour supply 
to the white economy by the landless people of Mission location. 
 
 Moreover, the maintenance and regimentation of policies that favoured the 
white economy at the expense of its African counterpart are further explained by 
the determination of the state to pursue its reserve policies (especially those 
pertaining to soil conservation) irrespective of the opinion of the Africans 
themselves. To illustrate this, right from the introduction of the scheme, very little if 
anything was required of the people’s opinion, and in most cases the headmen were 
the voice of the people. For instance in Mission location the scheme was introduced 
through the headman, Mr. C. W. Monakali whose task it was to make sure that the 
people cooperated. Furthermore, it also became his task to make sure that those 
who acted against the will of the government were dealt with accordingly. This 
shows that the government was determined to go ahead with these schemes 
whatever the will of the people was. In addition, because the will of the people was 
always against these schemes as is exemplified by the actions of the All African 
Convention (see Tabata, 1950) that mobilized people against the schemes, it made 
sense for the government to co-opt such entities as headmen; that is, so as to further 
its interests (of maximizing the supply of labour) in the face of local opposition (that 
was rightly convinced that the government meant to drive them into wage labour). 
 
 The commitment of government to improving African agriculture was 
further proved to be a myth when the government rejected the recommendations of 
the Tomlinson commission of 1954 and decided to act to the contrary. These were 
the recommendations that the population of the reserves be cut down by 50% to 
allow for sizable land portions (called Economic Farming Units) to be issued to the 
remaining half for full-time farming as well as that land tenure be based on 
freehold. The rejection of these recommendations and the subsequent policy of 
forced removals of people into the reserves was the final nail in the coffin of viable 
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agriculture in the reserves. Furthermore, it explains why areas such as Mission 
location never saw the improvement of agriculture specifically as a result of a 
government initiative; the South African government has never been interested 
improving agriculture in the reserves, and Mission location in particular, and this is 
contrary to claims by the architects of the Rehabilitation scheme. Instead, its 
interest has been in the political, social as well as economic control of Africans’ 
movements especially into urban areas (white towns and cities). As such, there still 
remains an analysis of the actual consequences of the conservation policies of the 
South African government. 
 
 More specifically, the point of departure for such an analysis is the finding 
(pertaining to Mission location in particular) that agriculture has declined since the 
introduction of soil conservation and white rule in general. But how has this come 
about in the face of such massive efforts as the Rehabilitation scheme? Regarding 
white rule, Mission location saw the changes in land tenure that resulted to only 21 
out of 118 households being able to access arable land. The rest were not only left 
landless, but were also put at the mercy the white economy for them to subsist. With 
the introduction of the Rehabilitation scheme, there were changes in agricultural 
practices as the scheme introduced the notion of fencing, livestock limitation, re-
allocation of land for different uses to name but a few. Though such things as 
fencing were initially done at the expense of the state, it became clear in the course 
of time that for subsequent repairs and re-fencing, the people themselves were to 
bear the cost. This meant that for the first time people had to pay for fencing. 
Payment in cash was also necessitated by the decline in livestock (partly as a result 
of stock limitation that was integral to the Rehabilitation scheme) that in turn meant 
the decline in kraal manure that was used as fertilizer; and hence fertilizer had to be 
bought in the form of commercial fertilizer. So, partly as a result of interference of 
the government, people in areas such as Mission location had to put up with new 
cash-demanding agricultural practices. As a result, people had to work for a cash 
wage in order to practice agriculture, let alone for their actual subsistence needs. 
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 Therefore, it can be seen that agriculture was in fact becoming a cost that 
was virtually impossible to afford. That it was impossible to afford can be seen in 
the present state of agriculture in Mission location. To illustrate this, out of the 21 
households with access to land, only 3 are currently practicing agriculture. Most 
revealing about the need for cash in agriculture is the fact that these three stand out 
as the most well-resourced for this undertaking; each of them own their own 
tractor, they make available the services of these tractors in gardens throughout the 
area, they have saleable livestock, and are therefore in a good position to invest cash 
in agriculture. As for the other 18 households, absence of viable cash-income sources 
is the reason why they do not practice agriculture. 
 
 So, indeed agriculture has regrettably declined in Mission location in the face 
of government initiated strategies and schemes claimed to be intended for its 
improvement; and the consequence of this has been an unavoidable dependence on 
wage labour for subsistence, an unforeseen consequence at least as far as the South 
African government officials would have liked to claim.         
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Glossary 
1. Ilali (Iilali-prural)- a well-defined cluster of homesteads that is the basic unit of 
settlement with its local name, headman, grazing and arable lands. 
2. Ookhokho- ancestors. 
3.  Amanxiwa- dwelling sites. 
4. Amasimi- arable lands. 
5. Iigadi- cultivated lands adjacent to homesteads (or rather integral to dwelling 
sites). 
 
       
                      
                                        
